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RETHINKING FERES: GRANTING ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE FOR SERVICE MEMBERS 
ANDREW F. POPPER* 
Abstract: In 1946, the ancient wall of sovereign immunity gave way with the 
passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) opening the courthouse doors to 
persons harmed by those acting on behalf of the federal government. From the 
outset, FTCA liability was limited by the expansive discretionary function ex-
ception and other express limitations on civil actions. Unresolved in the FTCA 
was the fate of members of our armed forces injured by actions “incident to ser-
vice” but outside of armed conflict. Four years later, in Feres v. United States, 
the Court addressed this question placing dramatic limits on civil tort claims of 
service members. The limitations were rationalized on the need to maintain or-
der, discipline, and chain-of-command. From Feres forward, most of those in-
jured incident to military service have been denied access to the very system of 
justice they pledge their lives to defend. That injustice has persisted for seven 
decades. This Article discusses Feres, the expansion of the “incident to service” 
prohibition, and recommends overturning Feres, amending the FTCA to allow 
access to justice in Article III courts for acts neither incident to nor essential for 
military service. It is time for victims of sexual assault, rape, and medical mal-
practice to have their day in court. Holding accountable the federal government 
and those engaged in misconduct will enhance, not undermine, respect for order, 
discipline, and chain-of-command. It is time for uniformly condemned acts to 
be subjected to the light of day in Article III courts. 
In sum, neither the three original Feres reasons nor the post hoc ration-
alization of “military discipline” justifies our failure to apply the FTCA 
as written. Feres was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the “wide-
spread, almost universal criticism” it has received. 
—Dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Justices  
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens1 
You’re old enough to kill but not for votin’ . . . . This whole crazy world 
is just too frustratin’ . . . . 
—P.F. Sloan, “Eve of Destruction”2 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2019, Andrew F. Popper. All rights reserved. 
 * Andrew F. Popper is the Bronfman Distinguished Professor of Law at American University, 
Washington College of Law. This Article is in part premised on the author’s experience with the 
Marine Corps, and his subsequent service to the United States government after his honorable 
discharge. 
 1 United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting In re 
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 1946, sovereign immunity provided an almost complete bar to 
civil tort actions against the federal government.3 While almost all individ-
uals and institutions of every type, shape, and size were subject to tort 
claims that held out the potential to make victims whole and deter others 
from similar misconduct, the federal government positioned itself safely,4 
immune and unaccountable,5 behind the ancient principle that the “king can 
do no wrong.”6 The injustice this inflicted needs no documentation.7 This 
Article is premised on the idea that the core of our government is now and 
has always been essential, representative, and supportive of the best and 
most important goals that our nation represents. Nevertheless, an institution 
with millions of employees and with the variety, mass, and depth of our 
government is bound to harbor a small number of individuals, institutions, 
and entities who act outside conventional notions of due care and fairness.8 
                                                                                                                           
 2 P.F. SLOAN, EVE OF DESTRUCTION (Dunhill Records 1965). This Article is not about draft-
ing eighteen-year-olds who are “old enough to kill” but not twenty-one, the voting age at the time. 
That one who serves is denied rights accorded all others (not in the military) is instead the topic of 
this piece. 
 3 See United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 288 (1846) (“[T]he [federal] gov-
ernment is not liable to be sued, except with its own consent, given by law.”). 
 4 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. & A. McLean eds., 1810) 
(“[I]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual with-
out its consent.”). 
 5 See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial 
Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 527 (2003) (detailing how sovereign immunity 
was invoked to bar courts from hearing some claims of legal wrongs). 
 6 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 8 (Mark Howe ed., 1963) (“[T]he 
rule remains. . . . The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to 
fit the meaning which it has received.”); WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
548–69 (5th ed. 1942) (explaining that the historic rationale of sovereign immunity was the belief 
in the divinity of the King; to allow such suits would contradict perfection). 
 7 Suffice it to say that almost any civil tort claim against the United States government con-
templated by a person in our armed forces would have been blocked by the defense of sovereign 
immunity prior to 1946. For that reason, there are no cases to cite for this point, only the argument 
that this shield from liability was outdated and unjust. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 8 Early efforts to address the need for governmental accountability were documented in a 
famous series of law review articles by Professor Edwin M. Borchard covering municipal and 
governmental immunity, an international perspective on public liability, and more. See generally 
Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1924) (“The difficulty, of 
course, lies in the fact that we consider ourselves bound by the fetters of a medieval doc-
trine . . . .”) (criticizing the immunity of government and dismissing the historical roots of sover-
eign immunity); Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1 
(1926); Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1039 (1927) 
(outlining the political theories underpinning the relationship between state and law); Edwin M. 
Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1928) (fo-
cusing on liability for wrongful acts including wrongful confinement). 
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In 1946, the ancient wall of sovereign immunity gave way with the pas-
sage of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).9 By allowing individuals to pur-
sue claims against the United States for negligence, the FTCA opened the 
courthouse doors for a limited number of those allegedly harmed by the mis-
conduct of individuals and entities acting on behalf or under the imprimatur 
of the United States government.10 Although liability was limited from the 
outset by the vast, vague, and vexing discretionary function exception 
(DFE),11 the federal government could now be accountable in Article III 
courts for acts of misconduct, negligence, malpractice, and similar claims.12 
Beyond the DFE, the FTCA had explicit limits13 including (but not 
limited to) a ban on punitive damages, limitations on the right to a jury trial, 
caps on attorney’s fees, an exhaustion-of-the-administrative-remedies re-
quirement, a bar on claims for injuries sustained abroad, and a bar on claims 
                                                                                                                           
 9 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671–2680 (2012) (originally enacted as 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (amended 2006)). 
 10 See generally PAUL FIGLEY, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (2d ed. 2018)  
(explaining the content of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), discussing the central substantive 
issues, and setting out the process for pursing an FTCA claim). 
 11 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2680(a); Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 334 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (“At the pleading stage, plaintiffs must invoke the court’s jurisdiction by alleging a 
claim that is facially outside of the discretionary function exception.” (citations omitted)); Rose-
bush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 1997) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (“Our Court’s 
decision in this case means that the discretionary function exception has swallowed, digested and 
excreted the liability-creating sections of the [FTCA]. It decimates the Act.”); Tippett v. United 
States, 108 F.3d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1997) (“If the discretionary function exception applies to 
the challenged governmental conduct, the United States retains its sovereign immunity, and the 
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the suit.”); William P. Kratzke, The Supreme 
Court’s Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 56 (1993) (“[T]he discretionary function exception is not susceptible to 
ready formulae and precise tests.”); Mark C. Niles, “Nothing but Mischief”: The Federal Tort 
Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1334 (2002) (ar-
guing that the discretionary function exception (DFE) has become a “veritable reassertion of [the] 
discarded limitation” of sovereign immunity); Cornelius J. Peck, Laird v. Nelms: A Call for Re-
view and Revision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 48 WASH. L. REV. 391, 415–18 (1973) (sug-
gesting changes to the DFE); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Discretionary Function Exception of 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81, 82 (1968) (characterizing the DFE as “vague and 
ambiguous”). 
 12 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (creating Article III courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (providing 
jurisdiction for “civil actions on claims against the United States”). 
 13 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680 (listing most of the exceptions to the FTCA as codified by 
§ 1346(b)). See generally Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different 
Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105 (2009) [hereinafter Figley, A Different Meta-
phor] (explaining how the FTCA works as a “limited waiver” of sovereign immunity); David W. 
Fuller, Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 375 (2011) (providing an overview of the exceptions to the FTCA). 
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for injuries sustained in combat or armed conflict.14 These exceptions, par-
ticularly those related to injuries sustained in combat or armed conflict, 
were not controversial at the time the FTCA was enacted, are not controver-
sial today, and are not the subject of this Article. Unresolved, however, was 
the fate of members of our armed forces and their families injured by actors 
and actions incident to military service outside of armed conflict or combat. 
Within four years of the passage of the FTCA, in 1950, the Supreme 
Court decided Feres v. United States,15 and in broad strokes placed dramatic 
limits on the civil-litigation rights of millions of Americans who were serv-
ing or have served in our armed forces.16 The Court rationalized these limi-
tations on, inter alia, the need to maintain order and discipline, chain-of-
command, military tradition, uniformity, avoidance of unjust enrichment, 
military preparedness, and efficiency.17 The force of this decision was ap-
parent immediately: most of those injured incident to military service would 
be denied access to the very system of justice they pledged to defend.18 The 
limitations in Feres did not affect the complex and comprehensive intra-
military benefits compensation system19 and the expansive military health 
care program.20 Likewise, Feres had no effect on intra-military sanctions for 
wrongdoing or failure to comply with lawful orders, rules, regulation, prac-
                                                                                                                           
 14 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671–2680 (2006). The statute was en-
acted as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812, 
which was codified and later amended in non-sequential sections of title 28 of the U.S. Code. See 
generally Major Jeffrey B. Garber, The (Too) Long Arm of Tort Law: Expanding the Federal Tort 
Claims Act’s Combatant Activities Immunity Exception to Fit the New Reality of Contractors on 
the Battlefield, 2016 ARMY L. 12 (examining judicial treatment of the combat exception). 
 15 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 16 See Joseph J. Dawson, Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine and a Better Definition of 
“Incident to Service,” 56 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 485, 493 (1982) (explaining the holding of Feres). 
 17 Feres, 340 U.S. at 143–46. 
 18 See Christopher G. Froelich, Closing the Equitable Loophole: Assessing the Supreme 
Court’s Next Move Regarding the Availability of Equitable Relief for Military Plaintiffs, 35 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 699, 699 (2005) (stating that the Feres doctrine has expanded to preclude many 
possible civil claims brought by servicemen); Nicole Melvani, Comment, The Fourteenth Excep-
tion: How the Feres Doctrine Improperly Bars Medical Malpractice Claims of Military Service 
Members, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 404 (2010) (explaining how the Feres doctrine has been ap-
plied to bar all medical malpractice claims by active-duty servicemen). 
 19 DoD Warrior Care, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://warriorcare.dodlive.mil/ [https://perma.cc/
VA2D-58G2] (describing the mission of Warrior Care by the Department of Defense as 
“[p]roactively supporting wounded, ill, and/or injured Service members in their recovery and 
reintegration or transition to civilian life”). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., WOUNDED, ILL, 
AND/OR INJURED COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS HANDBOOK (2018), http://warriorcare.dodlive.
mil/files/2018/05/DoD_Compensation-Benefits-Handbook_Apr-2018.pdf [http://perma.cc/GQ8F-
2STV] (setting out the array of benefits available through an intra-service compensation claims 
system). 
 20 See About the Military Health System, HEALTH.MIL, https://www.health.mil/About-MHS 
[http://perma.cc/W3JR-YQ3B] (describing the Military Health System). 
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tices, and standards governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ).21 Instead, Feres affected the legal capacity of the vast majority of 
service members harmed by wrongdoing to seek civil damages in Article III 
courts for their injuries. Also affected (or more accurately, lost) was the po-
tent deterrent effect of civil tort sanctions and the corresponding accounta-
bility those sanctions generate. This Article relies on the premise that the 
frequency of some of the wrongs experienced by service members (e.g., 
sexual assault, rape, and clear or gross malpractice) has increased to epi-
demic levels22 because of the absence of the accountability and deterrence 
that would otherwise flow from civil tort actions.23 
This limitation on the rights of those who protect and defend our coun-
try and way of life—our soldiers and sailors, Marines and Air Force mem-
bers, Coast Guard members, reservists, and even their families—has per-
sisted for sixty-eight years. Misconduct that forever changes the lives of so 
many of our fellow citizen soldiers was and is undeterred by civil tort sanc-
tion. A vast array of actions ordinarily addressed and resolved in Article III 
courts for citizens in the private sector go unpunished and undeterred when 
the victim (or in some instances only the perpetrator) is a service member 
and the misconduct is, broadly defined, “incident to service.”24 
It is understandable that those who run the risk of sanction would op-
pose changing a system that immunizes their misconduct. The desire to be 
free from sanction is not irrational—but it is unacceptable. That said, there 
is no easy path to change. A robust and responsive military is essential to 
our peaceful survival. A change that undermines discipline, chain-of-
command, existing compensation systems,25 sanctions under the UCMJ, 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2012) (codifying the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); 
see also Ann-Marie Woods, Note, A “More Searching Judicial Inquiry”: The Justiciability of Intra-
Military Sexual Assault Claims, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1329, 1348–52 (2014) (providing a brief history of 
the UCMJ’s enactment and describing the insular process for bringing a claim, specifically of sexual 
assault, under the UCMJ).  
 22 See Mission: Ending the Epidemic of Military Rape, PROTECT OUR DEFENDERS, https://www.
protectourdefenders.com/about/ [http://perma.cc/H4MY-GMEN] (describing military rape as an 
“epidemic”); U.S. Military Sexual Assaults Down as Reports Reach Record High, REUTERS (May 1, 
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-sexualassault/u-s-military-sexual-assaults-
down-as-reports-reach-record-high-idUSKBN17X2CF [http://perma.cc/LAB2-J9UV] (reporting that 
“the scourge of sexual assault in the military remains the status quo”). 
 23 See generally Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181 (2012) 
(arguing that deterrence is an important virtue of the tort system). 
 24 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (providing the “incident to service” exception). 
 25 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MILITARY COMPENSATION BACKGROUND PAPERS: 
COMPENSATION ELEMENTS AND RELATED MANPOWER COST ITEMS THEIR PURPOSES AND LEG-
ISLATIVE BACKGROUNDS (8th ed. 2018), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Military_Comp-
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAV9-49WN] [hereinafter MILITARY COMPENSATION BACKGROUND 
PAPERS] (presenting an impressive array of benefits designed for service members, ranging from 
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and efficient operation of our defense establishment is dangerous and irra-
tional. Yet in our democracy, power, efficiency, and fear of change cannot 
be the basis for the deprivation of justice and access to the courts. 
On enlistment, service members agree to be bound by a separate set of 
rules and accept a system bounded by discipline and unquestioning compli-
ance with lawful orders.26 Members of the armed forces take an oath to 
“support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all ene-
mies, foreign and domestic . . . .”27 Every service member understands the 
solemnity of that promise. The oath includes an implicit recognition that 
defense of our country may entail engagement in combat, in armed conflict, 
where the gravest of injuries are a possibility for all and an inevitability for 
some. That oath and understanding does not include the concession that 
service members would be without recourse should they be injured by egre-
gious and impermissible misconduct that advances no policy or goal of our 
armed forces. 
Over time, as courts struggled with the term “incident to service” and 
more and more claims were barred, Feres has ended up shielding a vast ar-
ray of deeply troubling tortious misconduct rather than protecting discipline 
and the chain-of-command.28 More than a half century ago, the late Su-
preme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren stated that “citizens in uniform” 
                                                                                                                           
compensation after suffering combat-related harms or toxic exposure, to life insurance). This 
compilation of “background papers” covers Persian Gulf War injuries, all current benefits for 
traumatic injury treatment and recovery, rehabilitation options after injury, compensation for inca-
pacitation, death benefits generally, special compensation for parachute injuries, and more. See 
generally id. 
 26 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (providing the UCMJ). 
 27 10 U.S.C. § 502. 
 28 See Froelich, supra note 18, at 699 (explaining that courts have expanded the Feres doc-
trine to bar a number of different claims); Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962) (drawing a distinction between military due process and civilian 
due process); Tara Willke, Three Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Federal Sovereign Immunity, the 
Feres Doctrine, and the Denial of Claims Brought by Military Mothers and Their Children for 
Injuries Sustained Pre-Birth, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 263, 276 (noting that the Supreme Court has not 
provided much guidance as to the “incident to service” exception); Melvani, supra note 18, at 
405–10 (detailing an egregious example of a military medical claim barred by the Feres doctrine); 
Samantha Kubek, Over 70,000 Military Sexual Assaults Took Place Last Year—Congress Must Take 
Action, FOX NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/over-70000-military-sexual-
assaults-took-place-last-year-congress-must-take-action [http://perma.cc/549Q-VC5R] (reporting 
that approximately 8,600 women and 6,300 men were sexually assaulted in the armed forces in 
2016, and that most victims were assaulted more than one time). See generally Captain Robert L. 
Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REV. 24 (1976) (outlining how 
the Feres doctrine has been applied inconsistently by circuit courts); David E. Seidelson, The 
Feres Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: New Insight into an Old Problem, 11 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 629 (1983) (surveying when and why federal courts have applied the Feres doctrine). 
1498 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1491 
should not be stripped of their basic rights simply because they are mem-
bers of the armed forces.29 Yet, to date, Feres is the law of the land. 
In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit la-
mented that “unless and until Congress or the Supreme Court . . . ‘con-
fine[s] the unfairness and irrationality . . . [Feres] has bred,’ we are bound 
by controlling precedent.”30 Recently, the Ninth Circuit again explored an 
“incident to service” tort claim in a case involving clear malpractice and 
“regretfully” concluded that the claims were barred by the Feres doctrine.31 
As noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, regret 
is a common judicial theme regarding the continued force of Feres as a bar 
to legitimate clams: “Suffice it to say that when a court is forced to apply 
the Feres doctrine, it frequently does so with a degree of regret.”32 
In recent years, those who serve in our armed forces have been thanked 
for their service by presidents33 and lauded at the start of nationally broadcast 
sporting events.34 Service members are routinely called heroes35—and they 
are. It is the highest public calling. Yet these gestures seem, at best, incom-
plete when accompanied by a deprivation of one of the basic rights due to all 
citizens. 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Warren, supra note 28, at 188. 
 30 Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Johnson, 481 U.S. 
at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 31 Daniel v. United States, 889 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 32 Ortiz v. United States ex rel. Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817, 822 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 33 See Marisa Schultz, Trump Delivers Thanksgiving Message [to] America’s Military, N.Y. POST 
(Nov. 22, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/11/22/trump-delivers-thanksgiving-message-americas-
military/ [http://perma.cc/FQ72-ZJJQ] (reporting that President Donald Trump thanked members of 
the military serving in Afghanistan); Tanya Somanader, President Obama Thanks America’s Troops 
and Marks a Milestone in the Afghanistan War, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Dec. 
15, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/12/15/president-obama-thanks-americas-
troops-and-marks-milestone-afghanistan-war [http://perma.cc/39L8-PWVW] (detailing President 
Barack Obama’s 2014 visit to a New Jersey military base, where he thanked military members and 
their families); George W. Bush, President of the U.S., President Thanks Military Personnel and 
Families For Serving Our Country (Dec. 7, 2004), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2004/12/20041207-2.html [http://perma.cc/HQ45-XQYM] (providing a transcript of 
President George W. Bush’s address to military personnel). 
 34 See Associated Press, NFL Honoring Military Service with November Campaign, MILI-
TARY TIMES (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/off-duty/military-sports/2018/11/04/
nfl-honoring-military-service-with-november-campaign/ [http://perma.cc/5R8S-7UC4] (quoting the 
NFL senior vice president of social responsibility in describing members of the military as “heroes”); 
NFL Honors Veterans and Military Members with “Salute to Service,” NFL COMMC’NS (2016), 
https://nflcommunications.com/Pages/NFL-Honors-Veterans-and-Military-Members-with-Salute-
To-Service.aspx [http://perma.cc/RMN5-DVG9] (describing the NFL’s annual recognition of 
members of the military). 
 35 See, e.g., HIRE HEROES USA, https://www.hireheroesusa.org/ [http://perma.cc/E3AX-
FE3K] (referring to military members and veterans as heroes). 
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The position taken in this Article is that the FTCA did not preordain 
Feres. The Feres Court was not completing a task Congress started. It was 
legislating. Professor Jonathan Turley, who studied the Feres doctrine in 
depth, concluded as follows: “The Feres doctrine stands as one of the most 
extreme examples of judicial activism in the history of the Supreme 
Court. . . . The Court’s sweeping assumptions about the necessity of im-
munity have produced significant costs for service members and society at 
large.”36 
The costs to which Professor Turley refers are not subtle: egregious 
misconduct has been neither sanctioned nor deterred, victims of unques-
tionably wrongful acts have not been made whole, and serious harms have 
not been redressed. Those most entitled to justice, and those most willing to 
fight and die for it, have not experienced the great promises of our legal 
system: fair and open hearings and an adversary system founded on a level 
playing field. In short, they have not experienced the blessings of simple 
justice.37 
The wrongs inflicted and discussed in this Article—sexual assault, 
rape, clear or gross malpractice, physical torment that meets the definition 
of torture—require action. Feres must be undone. There is a flip-side, how-
ever, that makes this far more complex than a simple recommendation to 
overturn Feres. The immunity Feres provides has allowed for the efficient 
and disciplined operation of our armed forces.38 Regard for the chain-of-
command has meant that lawful orders are followed, even those orders that, 
of necessity, can and do result in a risk of great harm. Advanced training, 
pushing service members to their physical and psychological limits, has 
gone forward without interference from civil courts. Moreover, military jus-
tice, through the implementation of statutes, rules, and regulations of all 
manner, and through the remarkable system of intra-military process gov-
erned by the UCMJ, has evolved. Outstanding law students and lawyers 
committed both to being the best in the profession and to serving their 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign Immuni-
ty in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 89 (2003). 
 37 See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 191 (1976) (discussing “simple justice”). 
Here, the term “simple justice” is less a reference to Richard Kluger’s magnificent text on Brown 
v. Board of Education, than to the basic right of every person subject to the laws of the United 
States government to seek justice in Article III courts. See id. 
 38 See Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV. 
899, 907 (2010) (arguing that whether elected or not, civil court judges should not be reviewing 
policy choices affecting military chain-of-command or other discretionary decisions). 
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country have sought positions in the various Judge Advocate General’s 
Corps in the different branches of the armed forces.39 
The challenge of this Article is that the same immunity that shields 
wrongdoers, leaving individuals and institutions within the government un-
accountable, has also played a role in the evolution of our unquestionably 
extraordinary and exceptional armed forces. These are potent competing 
forces. Against this backdrop, it is time to rethink Feres. 
This Article discusses Feres v. United States,40 the FTCA, the expansion 
of the “incident to service” prohibition, and case law and literature in the 
field, and makes the following recommendation: Feres should be overturned 
and the FTCA amended to allow access to justice in Article III courts for 
those injured by actions that are neither incident nor essential to military ser-
vice. These actions include sexual assault, rape, vicious and unjustified physi-
cal violence, gross or reckless medical malpractice, repetitive incidents of 
driving under the influence of narcotics or alcohol, nonconsenting and un-
knowing exposure to deathly substances, and invidious discrimination. 
I. FERES V. UNITED STATES 
In the four years after the adoption of the FTCA and before the Feres 
decision, the Supreme Court decided several cases involving civil tort lia-
bility for service members. In Jefferson v. United States, decided in 1948, 
the plaintiff, an active-duty service member, filed a medical malpractice 
claim after undergoing abdominal surgery.41 Eight months after discharge 
and during a subsequent surgery, a towel marked “Medical Department U.S. 
Army” was found in his stomach.42 Plaintiff filed an FTCA malpractice 
claim, but the case was dismissed based on a finding that the FTCA did not 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Ilana Kowarski, 5 Traits for Would-Be Military Lawyers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RE-
PORT (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/
articles/2016-11-11/5-traits-law-students-can-develop-to-be-a-military-attorney [https://perma.cc/
M9YK-Q3Z3] (identifying versatility, self-reliance, physical fitness, humility, and adventurous-
ness as the five traits that a prospective JAG attorney should possess); Julie L. Massing, The Mak-
ing of a JAG Attorney: Where the Law and the Military Meet, FED. L., Mar. 2017, at 24, 25, http://
www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-Lawyer-Magazine/2017/March/Features/The-Making-of-a-
JAG-Attorney-Where-the-Law-and-the-Military-Meet.aspx?FT=.pdf [http://perma.cc/VQ75-XXZB] 
(profiling a law student who sought a position as a Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps attor-
ney because she wanted to “help people” and “serve [her] country”); Alison Monahan, JAG 
Corps: Military Lawyer, BALANCE CAREERS (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.thebalancecareers.com/
want-to-be-a-military-lawyer-learn-about-jag-4039991 [http://perma.cc/YH5G-XUDZ] (outlining 
the requirements for joining the JAG Corps). 
 40 Feres, 340 U.S. 135. 
 41 Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 708 (D. Md. 1948). 
 42 Id. at 709. 
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cover harms suffered in the course of military service.43 While the Jefferson 
appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Brooks v. United States in 
1949, a case involving a deadly accident between a government vehicle 
driven by an off-duty service member and a car carrying a father (a service 
member) and his two sons.44 The father was on leave at the time.45 One ser-
vice member died in the accident and others were severely injured. The sur-
viving service member sued under the FTCA, and prevailed at the trial-
court level before losing the case on appeal at the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.46 The plaintiffs ultimately prevailed at the 
Supreme Court.47 
Although the government in Brooks argued that grave disruption of or-
der and discipline would result if service members had access to Article III 
courts, the Court found that the accident had nothing to do with military 
service, and if the claim were barred, the Court reasoned, it would prevent 
innocent victims from being compensated.48 This finding was predicated on 
the Court’s view that the language of the FTCA did not exclude all claims 
by service members, particularly those not incident to service.49 The Court 
also found that resolution of the fate of claims “incident to service” would 
have to wait for a “wholly different case.”50 That different case was pre-
sented the following year in Feres v. United States. 
A. Feres v. United States: The Origin of the Controversy 
Feres v. United States consolidated three conflicting federal circuit 
court cases51 and held that the FTCA barred the vast majority of service 
members from pursuing civil actions in tort in any Article III court for inju-
ries incident to military service.52 
Feres involved an active-duty service member who died in a barracks 
fire.53 An FTCA wrongful death action alleged that the fire was the result of 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Id. at 712. 
 44 Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949). 
 45 Id. 
 46 United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49. 
 47 Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50–51. 
 48 Id. at 51. 
 49 Id. at 49. 
 50 Id. at 52. 
 51 Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 
1 (10th Cir. 1949); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff’d, 340 U.S. 135. 
 52 Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (“[T]he Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to 
service.”). 
 53 Id. at 137. 
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the government’s negligence in failing to maintain reasonably safe housing 
for troops. The question on which the Court focused, however, was not fire 
safety but rather whether the suit could go forward at all. Specifically, it 
considered whether the FTCA allowed civil actions against the federal gov-
ernment in cases where an injury was in some way—in almost any way—
incident to service. Despite the lack of clarity in the text of the FTCA54 or in 
the legislative history of the statute,55 the Court determined that the FTCA 
waiver of immunity was not applicable to the alleged injuries in the cases 
before the Court (and thus the claims were barred) because each was some-
how incident to service.56 The opinion did not terminate the right to pursue 
a civil judgment in all such cases and left room for review of FTCA claims 
on a case-by-case basis.57 The stage was set, however, for what was to fol-
low. From Feres forward, the fate of service members injured incident to 
service was, in the vast majority of cases, sealed.58 
Although the Feres Court made clear that the purpose of the FTCA was 
to hold the United States accountable in Article III courts for certain types of 
tortious misconduct,59 it held there was no basis in the FTCA to extend that 
right to members of the armed forces injured incident to their service.60 The 
Court emphasized that the relationship between those in the armed forces and 
the federal government is “distinctively federal in nature”61 and that such 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id. at 139 (“These considerations, it is said, should persuade us to cast upon Congress, as 
author of the confusion, the task of qualifying and clarifying its language if the liability here as-
serted should prove so depleting of the public treasury as the Government fears.”). 
 55 Id. at 138 (describing the lack of “guiding materials” and highlighting that if the Court 
misinterprets the Act, “at least Congress possesses a ready remedy”). 
 56 Id. at 146; see John Astley, Note, United States v. Johnson: Feres Doctrine Gets New Life 
and Continues to Grow, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 185, 195 (1988) (“An analysis of the FTCA legislative 
history does not clearly indicate whether Congress intended to exclude military personnel from 
FTCA protection. From the Act’s history, however, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress 
intended servicemembers to be covered.”). 
 57 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 (noting that “it remains for courts, in exercise of their jurisdic-
tion, to determine whether any claim is recognizable in law”); Seidelson, supra note 28, at 631 
(explaining that the Feres decision was intended to allow courts to determine the applicability of 
the FTCA at their discretion). 
 58 See Turley, supra note 36, at 10 (summarizing the “bizarre and disturbing rulings” that 
Feres has produced); Melvani, supra note 18, at 428–29 (2010) (discussing potential claims that 
would be barred by Feres); Kenneth R. Wiltberger, Note, The Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medi-
cal Accountability Act of 2009: An Opportunity to Overturn the Feres Doctrine as It Applies to 
Military Medical Malpractice, 8 AVE MARIA L. REV. 473, 497–98 (2010) (describing “decades of 
unwillingness” on the part of the Supreme Court and Congress to reduce or eliminate the applica-
tion of the Feres doctrine). 
 59 Feres, 340 U.S. at 141. 
 60 Id. (“[P]laintiffs can point to no liability of a ‘private individual’ even remotely analogous 
to that which they are asserting against the United States.”). 
 61 Id. at 143 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)). 
2019] Rethinking Feres: Granting Access to Justice for Service Members 1503 
harms were covered or compensable through other venues.62 The Court rea-
soned that if Congress had intended to provide access to Article III courts for 
intra-military civil tort claims, it would have done so explicitly.63 Prior to 
Feres, in the event the internal systems within the military failed, service 
members could seek direct assistance from a member of Congress who could 
advocate for a “private bill” that, if passed, redressed their grievances.64 The 
lack of overwhelming numbers of such private bills (and the cumbersome and 
seemingly arbitrary nature of such relief) between 1935 and 1945 suggested 
to the Court that the intra-military compensation system was not only worka-
ble, but should be the exclusive mechanism for redress of grievances, not Ar-
ticle III courts and not private bills.65 
The Court in Feres reasoned in dicta that were intra-military civil tort 
claims common, it would be problematic at many levels.66 This position, 
however, is driven by a more basic set of issues—tort liability, the Court sug-
gested, could undermine essential respect for and compliance with the chain-
of-command, and would be a “radical departure” from established practices.67 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Id. at 144 (“This Court . . . cannot escape attributing some bearing upon it to enactments by 
Congress which provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or 
death of those in armed services.”). Every branch of the armed forces has a compensation claims 
system and all are administrative. See generally MILITARY COMPENSATION BACKGROUND PA-
PERS, supra note 25 (providing an overview of the military compensation system). 
 63 Feres, 340 U.S. at 144. Members of Congress have, on occasion, tried to undo Feres but 
have been unable to garner the votes needed. See H.R. NO. 111-466, at 2 (2009) (proposing an 
amendment to the FTCA that would “allow service members to sue for damages when they are 
harmed by medical malpractice”); The Feres Doctrine: An Examination of This Military Exception 
to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1–3 
(2002) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg
88833/pdf/CHRG-107shrg88833.pdf [http://perma.cc/322Z-FD4Q] (introducing legislation to 
amend the Feres doctrine); Jennifer L. Carpenter, Comment, Military Medical Malpractice: Adopt 
the Discretionary Function Exception as an Alternative to the Feres Doctrine, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 
35, 59–60 (2003) (advocating for the discretionary function exception as a solution to the prob-
lems created by the Feres doctrine); Melissa Feldmeier, Note, At War with the Feres Doctrine: 
The Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 145, 
153 (2010) (discussing legislation that could modify the harsh impact of Feres); Wiltberger, supra 
note 58, at 497–98 (noting that Congress has had “many opportunities” to change the Feres doc-
trine but “has always resisted doing so”). 
 64 James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification 
and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1863, 1877–82 
(2010). 
 65 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 139 (“Congress, as author of the confusion [should have the] task of 
qualifying and clarifying its language if the liability here asserted should prove so depleting of the 
public treasury as the Government fears.”). 
 66 Id. at 143 (articulating concerns that even included choice of law and conflict of laws prob-
lems: “[t]hat the geography of an injury should select the law to be applied to his tort claim makes 
no sense”). 
 67 Id. at 146. 
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B. Evolution of the Feres Doctrine 
The prohibition against civil tort actions applicable to active-duty (and 
even post-discharge) service members in Feres68 initially co-existed with 
the marginally permissive interpretations of the FTCA.69 In United States v. 
Brown,70 decided by the Supreme Court in 1954, four years after Feres, a 
discharged veteran underwent knee surgery at the Veterans Administration 
(VA) Hospital and sustained permanent harm to his leg.71 Although the 
original injury was “incident to service,”72 the negligence (medical malprac-
tice) occurred after he had been discharged and would, the Court found, be 
“cognizable under local law, if the defendant were a private party.”73 The 
Court held that the claim should be allowed, suggesting that if an Article III 
court would be available to a civilian, it should also be available to post-
discharged service members. 
At that juncture, access to Article III courts became unpredictable, de-
pendent on a series of factors including when and where the negligent act 
occurred, the duty status of the plaintiff, whether the service member was 
performing a military activity as opposed to taking advantage of a privilege 
or enjoying a benefit conferred as a result of military service, and whether 
the service member was subject to military discipline or control at the time 
of the injury.74 Although all important considerations, no single factor was 
dispositive, and each could be viewed in light of the totality of the circum-
stances of a given case.75 
In 1996, forty-six years after Feres, these factors were reduced to a list 
by the Ninth Circuit in Dreier v. United States.76 The court stated that it 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. at 144 (noting that Congress was aware that it was barring common law tort claims 
incident to service: “there was no awareness that the Act might be interpreted to permit recovery 
for injuries incident to military service”); see Lewis v. United States, 663 F.2d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 
1981) (finding that Congress’s failure to take action to address the Court’s “incident to service” 
interpretation of the FTCA supports the view that Congress is disinclined to change the incident to 
service bar to civil tort claims); Rhodes, supra note 28, at 24 (stating that the “incident to service” 
language in Feres has “frustrated many injured military members and a few federal judges”). 
 69 See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50 (examining whether members of the military can recover for 
injuries that are not incident to service). 
 70 United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). 
 71 Id. at 110. 
 72 Id. at 112. 
 73 Id. at 111, 113. 
 74 Figley, A Different Metaphor, supra note 13, at 1116–17. 
 75 Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1151 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 76 Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a widow was not 
barred from recovering against the United States after her husband was fatally injured when he fell 
into a negligently maintained wastewater drainage following an afternoon of drinking while off 
duty). 
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would look to the following factors to determine whether an activity is inci-
dent to service: “(1) the place where the negligent act occurred; (2) the duty 
status of the plaintiff when the negligent act occurred; (3) the benefits ac-
cruing to the plaintiff because of his status as a service member; and (4) the 
nature of the plaintiff’s activities at the time the negligent act occurred.”77 
Dreier suggested that parties should be given the chance to assess “whether 
the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions, . . . 
and whether the suit might impair essential military discipline,” as well as 
“the type of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary 
in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effec-
tiveness.”78 The decision regarding whether an injury is incident to military 
service79 resulted in “considerable confusion among the circuits”80 and has 
led to uncertainty no matter what factors a court applies.81 
C. Expansive Application of “Incident to Service” 
Following Feres and Brown, courts continued to broaden the definition 
of “incident to service,”82 applying the prohibition to medical malpractice, 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Dreier, 106 F.3d at 848 (citing Bon v. United States, 802 F.2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
See Jennifer L. Zyznar, Comment, The Feres Doctrine: “Don’t Let This Be It. Fight!,” 46 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 607, 623–24 (2013) (assessing the factors that may or may not lead to access to 
Article III courts). 
 78 Dreier, 106 F.3d at 852 (internal quotations omitted). 
 79 See Kelly L. Dill, Comment, The Feres Bar: The Right Ruling for the Wrong Reason, 24 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 78 (2001) (describing which injuries have been categorized as “incident to 
service”). 
 80 Zyznar, supra note 77, at 614 n.53 (citing Anne R. Riley, Note, United States v. Johnson: 
Expansion of the Feres Doctrine to Include Servicemembers’ FTCA Suits Against Civilian Gov-
ernment Employees, 42 VAND. L. REV. 233, 244 (1989)) (describing “incident to service” as a 
“seemingly simple phrase” that has resulted in significant confusion at the circuit court level); see 
Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is difficult to know precisely what 
the [Feres] doctrine means today . . . [it is] an extremely confused and confusing area of law.”). 
 81 See Figley, A Different Metaphor, supra note 13, at 1116 (suggesting the following test: 
“whether the injury arose while a service member was on active duty; whether the injury arose on 
a military situs; whether the injury arose during a military activity; whether the service member 
was taking advantage of a privilege or enjoying a benefit conferred as a result of military service 
when the injury arose; and whether the injury arose while the service member was subject to mili-
tary discipline or control”). 
 82 See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 681 (barring a wrongful death action even though the harm was 
caused by the Federal Aviation Administration, a civilian agency, in large part because the dece-
dent was a service member); Potts v. United States, 723 F.2d 20, 20 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) 
(denying recovery to a Navy corpsman for injuries sustained after being struck by a cable while on 
leave); see also Major v. United States, 835 F.2d 641, 644–45 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (bar-
ring an action for recovery from injuries sustained in an on-base motor vehicle accident, which 
occurred because of the actions of an intoxicated, noncommissioned officer). The court stated that 
in years prior, “the [Supreme] Court ha[d] embarked on a course dedicated to broadening the 
Feres doctrine to encompass, at a minimum, all injuries suffered by military personnel that are 
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exposure to toxic substances, murders or suicides, sexual assaults, and 
more—hardly activity that could or should be considered incident to or an 
essential part of military service.83 A brief look at those harms follows. 
1. Post-Feres Medical Malpractice Cases 
In Henninger v. United States, decided in 1973, the Ninth Circuit 
barred a medical malpractice claim involving negligent acts that resulted in 
the atrophy of a Navy serviceman’s left testicle.84 The malpractice began 
during a physical exam, one of the final steps that was to lead to plaintiff’s 
discharge. When a “double hernia”85 (generally referred to as a bilateral 
inguinal hernia) was found, the plaintiff asked to have the condition treated 
in a non-military hospital after he became a civilian. The military doctor 
refused to sign the release authorizing civilian care and performed the oper-
ation, which resulted in irreparable harm. The court found that these cir-
cumstances fit the definition of “incident to military service,” barred recov-
ery, and rationalized the decision based on the mandate in Feres and the 
availability of veteran’s compensation benefits.86 An explanation as to how 
this decision enhanced military discipline or forwarded any rational interest 
other than avoidance of accountability and limiting public exposure of 
wrongdoing was left unexplained by this judicial opinion. 
That said, varying interpretations of the DFE in medical malpractice 
claims have allowed some cases to go forward in highly limited circum-
                                                                                                                           
even remotely related to the individual’s status as a member of the military.” Major, 835 F.2d at 
644. 
 83 See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 297–98, 305 (1983) (barring a claim based on ra-
cial discrimination); Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 37 (2d Cir. 2017) (barring a sexual assault 
claim); Futrell v. United States 859 F.3d 403, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2017) (barring a claim for the mili-
tary’s failure to pay a retired member’s salary and insurance for a year); Filer v. Donley, 690 F.3d 
643, 645–49 (5th Cir. 2012) (barring a claim based on a hostile work environment in which a 
superior hung a noose around a grenade in his office with the number one on it and told the air 
reserve technicians to take a number to wait for the “complaint department”); Wetherill v. Geren, 
616 F.3d 789, 790 (8th Cir. 2010) (barring a claim by a dual-status National Guard member). But 
see Jackson v. Tate, 648 F.3d 729, 730 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing a discharged serviceman to bring 
a claim against a recruiter who forged the serviceman’s signature on re-enlistment papers); Dill, 
supra note 79, at 78 (noting that some courts have reasoned around the bar to recovery for service 
members). The courts have also extended the doctrine to apply to cadets at military academies. 
See Collins v. United States, 642 F.2d 217, 218 (7th Cir. 1981) (barring a cadet from bringing a 
medical malpractice claim for vision loss experienced while at the academy). Courts have even 
incorporated non-combat torts, reckless or knowing acts, and cases of alleged cover-up into what 
constitutes circumstances that are “incident to service.” John W. Hamilton, Note, Contamination 
at U.S. Military Bases: Profiles and Responses, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 223, 242–43 (2016). 
 84 Henninger v. United States, 472 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 815–16. 
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stances.87 When courts assess such claims based on Feres, the “incident to 
military service” bar was and is almost insurmountable.88 Courts that have 
moved beyond Feres, however, have found that the DFE was created to 
“shield the government from liability for the exercise of governmental dis-
cretion, not to shield the government from claims of garden-variety medical 
malpractice.”89 That is not to say that victims of military medical malprac-
tice have ready or predictable access to Article III courts under the FTCA;90 
many health care cases involve discretionary judgments (and thus are off 
limits due to the DFE) but this does not bar all medical malpractice cases.91 
In Jackson v. United States, decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1997, a re-
servist lacerated his hand at a weekend drill.92 The military doctor treating 
the reservist did not inform him of the prompt need to have surgery, and this 
resulted in permanent damage to his hand.93 Again, when examining the 
application of Feres, the court found that “the development of the doctrine 
. . . has broadened to such an extent that ‘practically any suit that implicates 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Carpenter, supra note 63, at 50–52. 
 88 Id. (citing Romero v. United States, 954 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1992)) (declining to apply Feres 
to a claim for negligence that allegedly caused a child’s cerebral palsy even though the negligent 
prenatal care that caused the injury was given to an active-duty servicewoman); West v. United 
States, 729 F.2d 1120, 1128 (7th Cir. 1984) (declining to bar liability for the wrongful death of 
one twin and the birth defects of another). But see Del Rio v. United States, 833 F.2d 282, 288 
(11th Cir. 1987) (deciding a servicewoman’s injuries received during negligent prenatal care were 
incident to service); Scales v. United States, 685 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Feres to 
a suit brought by the parents of a boy who was born with mental and physical delays resulting 
from a rubella vaccination during his servicewoman-mother’s pregnancy). 
 89 See Sigman v. United States, 217 F.3d 785, 795 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing numerous cases that 
have allowed such medical malpractice claims to move forward). 
 90 See Patricia Kime, Tragedy and Injustice: The Heartbreaking Truth About Military Medical 
Malpractice, MIL. TIMES (July 10, 2016), https://www.militarytimes.com/pay-benefits/military-
benefits/health-care/2016/07/10/tragedy-and-injustice-the-heartbreaking-truth-about-military-
medical-malpractice/ [http://perma.cc/A7NM-Z77F] [hereinafter Kime, The Heartbreaking Truth 
About Military Medical Malpractice] (quoting Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health 
Affairs Dr. Jonathan Woodson as stating that allowing service members to bring suit for injuries 
sustained while on duty could create “chaos”). 
 91 See Feldmeier, supra note 63, at 176–77 & n.211 (citing Collazo v. United States, 850 F.2d 
1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[W]here only professional, nongovernmental discretion is at issue, the ‘dis-
cretionary function’ exception does not apply.”)); see also Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 
1241–42 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the United States is immune from claims involving discre-
tionary policy-based decisions on the distribution of limited medical resources but is not immune 
from claims related to the “actual administration of medical care by its employees”); Martinez v. 
Maruszczak, 168 P.3d 720, 729 (Nev. 2007) (interpreting the FTCA’s discretionary function ex-
ception to the waiver of sovereign immunity and explaining that “while a physician’s diagnostic 
and treatment decisions involve judgment and choice, thus satisfying the [Berkovitz-Gaubert] 
test’s first criterion, those decisions generally do not include policy considerations, as required by 
the test’s second criterion”). 
 92 Jackson v. United States, 110 F.3d 1484 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 93 Id. at 1486. 
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the military judgments and decisions runs the risk of colliding with 
Feres.’”94 The view of the expansiveness of the incident to service excep-
tion has not changed over the last two decades. In Daniel v. United States, 
decided in 2018 by the Ninth Circuit, a Navy nurse died after delivery of 
her child due to postpartum hemorrhaging.95 The Ninth Circuit dismissed 
the claims of medical malpractice and wrongful death based on Feres.96 
The concern expressed in Jackson, that any suit implicating the mili-
tary is barred, is even more troubling when it is extended to claims of civil-
ian children of service members. In Mondelli v. United States, decided by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1983, the child 
of a service member was born with retinal blastoma, a genetically trans-
ferred form of cancer.97 The cause of the child’s condition was linked to a 
genetic anomaly that was a consequence of her father’s exposure to radia-
tion during nuclear device testing. The court lamented that barring the claim 
would be an injustice—punishing a child for the harm the parents had sus-
tained—but did so nonetheless because her harm arose from the initial inju-
ry to her father that was incident to his service.98 
The courts have, however, allowed recovery on behalf of a child in-
jured in utero in some cases. In Brown v. United States, decided by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 2006, a doctor’s neg-
ligent action in the course of routine treatment of a pregnancy allegedly re-
sulted in the child being born with spina bifida.99 The court held that the 
Feres doctrine did not apply in such a situation because the FTCA “does not 
preclude recovery for negligent prenatal injuries to the child of a military ser-
vice person that are independent of any injury to the child’s parent.”100 
In the Ninth Circuit’s 2013 opinion Ritchie v. United States, involving a 
claim similar to that in Brown, however, a mother was ordered to continue 
military training while pregnant contrary to the admonitions of the mother’s 
physician.101 Stresses in training led to the premature birth and subsequent 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id. at 1486–87 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 95 Daniel, 889 F.3d at 980. 
 96 Id. at 980, 982 (citing Atkinson v. United States, 825 F.2d 202, 203, 205–06 (9th Cir. 
1987)) (relying on application of the Feres doctrine to bar the claim of a pregnant United States 
Army Specialist who had been sent home from the hospital multiple times before being diagnosed 
with preeclampsia and delivering a stillborn child). 
 97 Mondelli v. United States, 711 F. 2d 567, 568 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 98 Id. But see Romero, 954 F.2d at 224–26 (allowing recovery for a child born with cerebral 
palsy because of the mother’s untreated incompetent cervix, reasoning that the treatment would 
have guaranteed the health of the child—a civilian—and therefore cannot be governed by Feres). 
 99 Brown v. United States, 462 F.3d 609, 610 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 100 Id. at 616. 
 101 Ritchie, 733 F.3d at 878 (allowing a child in utero to recover, but not the mother). 
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death of her infant.102 In a wrongful death action for the loss of the child, the 
court held that the “in utero” exception did not apply in this instance because 
the mother had suffered the injury to her child incident to service.103 
2. Murder and Suicide 
Civil tort actions following a murder or suicide have also been barred 
under the expansive interpretation of “incident to service” in Feres.104 In 
United States v. Shearer, decided by the Supreme Court in 1984, a service 
member was kidnapped and killed by another serviceman while away from 
his base.105 Previously, the assailant had been convicted of an unrelated 
manslaughter in Germany,106 a fact known to the assailant’s superiors who, 
nonetheless, allowed him to stay on the base.107 The deceased’s parents al-
leged that the Army had been negligent by failing to remove or identify the 
assailant, and that led to the death of their son. Relying on Feres, the Court 
barred the claim on the premise that allowing the case to go forward would 
affect military discipline, even though the murder occurred off the base.108 
Feres was made applicable to suicide in Purcell v. United States, decided 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 2011, which 
involved the death of a twenty-one-year-old sailor.109 Although a phone call 
beforehand expressed concern that the sailor had a gun and planned on killing 
himself, the sailor’s superiors took no action and he subsequently took his 
life.110 Even though the family had not received any benefits related to the 
suicide and thus would not recover twice111 (dual recovery is a common con-
cern expressed in Feres cases), the Seventh Circuit barred recovery, seeming-
ly across the board, in cases involving homicide or suicide.112 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Id. at 873. 
 103 Id. at 878. 
 104 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 135 (providing the “incident to service” exception). 
 105 United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 53 (1985). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 53. 
 108 Id. at 58. 
 109 Purcell v. United States, 656 F.3d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 110 Id. at 465. 
 111 Id. at 467. See Ritchie, 733 F.3d at 875 (citing Persons v. United States, 925 F.2d 292, 
295–97 (9th Cir. 1991)) (holding that the family of a man who committed suicide as an off-duty 
member of the military, after the naval hospital released him, could not recover under the FTCA 
due to the Feres bar). 
 112 See Purcell, 656 F.3d at 467; see also Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 864–65, 867–
68 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the family of a sailor who drowned during a Navy-led recreational 
rafting trip cannot recover under the FTCA because the totality-of-the-circumstances test deter-
mined that certain unrelated military activities fall under Feres). 
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3. Sexual Assault and Other Egregious Misconduct 
Sexual assault, currently at epidemic levels in the military,113 and vio-
lent hazing114 have been deemed incident to service much like murder and 
suicide.115 Accordingly, any deterrent effect the tort system would produce 
to lessen similar misconduct is lost. In Klay v. Panetta, decided by the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 2014, the plaintiff had 
argued that “being victimized by a sexual assault cannot possibly be consid-
ered to be an ‘activity’ incident to military service . . . .”116 The court reject-
ed plaintiff’s claim,117 explaining that the question was not whether being 
raped is an activity incident to military service, but rather, whether the con-
nection to service came from the fact that the assailant was a service mem-
ber.118 
Sexual assault is not incident to military service.119 It is a crime, prose-
cuted, albeit internally, in our armed forces.120 Prosecution, however, does 
                                                                                                                           
 113 See Kubek, supra note 28 (calling for reform to end sexual assault in the military); PRO-
TECT OUR DEFENDERS, supra note 22 (describing military rape as an “epidemic”); Sexual Assault 
Reports in U.S. Military Reach Record High: Pentagon, NBC NEWS (May 1, 2017), https://www.
nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sexual-assault-reports-u-s-military-reach-record-high-pentagon-n753
566 [http://perma.cc/6WYE-L5E8] (reporting on the high number of sexual assaults in the military 
in 2016). 
 114 See Veloz-Gertrudis v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (involving a 
brutal beating that included being hung upside down by the ankles until the individual’s bones 
separated). 
 115 See Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying the Feres doctrine to 
bar plaintiff’s relief sought for a sexual assault that occurred while serving in the military); Veloz-
Gertrudis, 768 F. Supp. at 39 (holding that a former service member was barred from bringing an 
FTCA claim against the government for an incident of hazing that led to post-traumatic stress 
disorder). 
 116 Klay v. Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 758 F.3d 369; Klay, 758 
F.3d at 375 (noting the claim flowed from the defendant’s alleged mismanagement of the mili-
tary). 
 117 Klay, 758 F.3d at 377 (acknowledging this was a civil rights/Bivens claim, and such claims 
are simply unavailable to members of the armed forces); see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 
669, 681–84 (1987) (noting that Bivens suits are never permitted for constitutional violations aris-
ing from military service, no matter how severe the injury or how egregious the rights infringe-
ment); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 621–22 (5th ed. 2007); see, e.g., Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 390–95 (1971) (expounding the relationship between 
federal agents and private citizens generally). 
 118 Klay, 758 F.3d at 375–76 (reasoning that because the assailant was a service member sub-
ject to discipline in the military, a civil case focused on the same behavior would interfere with 
military judgments). 
 119 See generally Evan R. Seamone & David M. Traskey, Maximizing VA Benefits for Survi-
vors of Military Sexual Trauma: A Practical Guide for Survivors and Their Advocates, 26 COL-
UM. J. GENDER & L. 343 (2014) (providing a useful guide for those who represent victims of sex-
ual assault in the military). 
 120 See Lisa Ferdinando, DoD Releases Annual Report on Sexual Assault in Military, DEP’T 
OF DEF. (May 1, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1508127/dod-releases-annual-
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not equate with justice for a victim. Victims deserve their day in court.121 
With public focus on this issue by virtue of the “#MeToo”122 and “Time’s 
Up”123 movements, this is the right moment to break free of such preposter-
ous reasoning, particularly in terms of our armed forces. Our military justi-
fiably takes pride in teaching respect and decency, insisting on proper deco-
rum, referring to civilians as “Sir” or “Ma’am,” and providing a model for 
those within and outside the armed forces.124 That laudable vision of human 
interaction is patently incompatible with a jurisprudence that characterizes 
sexual assault as incident to military service.125 
Beyond sexual assault, the FTCA has prevented individuals with trau-
matic brain injuries, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and complica-
tions from chemical exposure from recovering in Article III tort cases even 
when such injuries are the result of nonconsenting experimentation, expo-
sure to toxins,126 or other actions that bear no meaningful relationship to 
acceptable military service.127 
                                                                                                                           
report-on-sexual-assault-in-military/ [http://perma.cc/8K4L-DWHG] (reporting on sexual assault 
prosecutions in the military). 
 121 See Naomi Himmelfarb et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Female Veterans with Mili-
tary and Civilian Sexual Trauma, 19 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS, 837, 838 (2006) (stating that approxi-
mately twenty-three percent of females report being sexually assaulted in the military). 
 122 See ME TOO MOVEMENT, https://metoomvmt.org/ [http://perma.cc/FP9J-3S7P]. 
 123 See TIME’S UP, https://www.timesupnow.com/ [http://perma.cc/UC4K-J8P5]. 
 124 See Getting the Lowdown on Customs and Courtesies, MILITARY.COM, https://www.military.
com/join-armed-forces/getting-the-lowdown-on-customs-and-courtesies.html [http://perma.cc/6EAP-
5HAB]. 
 125 See Klay, 758 F.3d at 377 (concluding sexual assault was incident to service). 
 126 See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671 (considering the claim of a sergeant who was “secretly ad-
ministered doses of [LSD] pursuant to an Army plan to study the effects of the drug on human 
subjects”); Sweet v. United States, 687 F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir. 1982) (examining a tort claim 
based on a plaintiff’s participation in a military drug experiment); Veloz-Gertrudis, 768 F. Supp. 
at 39 (discussing a tort claim arising out of plaintiff’s compulsory participation in a military haz-
ing exercise). 
 127 See Helen D. O’Conor, Federal Tort Claims Act Is Available for OIF TBI Veterans, Despite 
Feres, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 273, 275 (2008) (examining the difficulties veterans face in 
obtaining additional compensation to cover issues arising from inadequate medical and rehabilitative 
care received through the military). It is estimated that twenty percent of troops deployed since 2001 
have been affected by a traumatic brain injury. Jesse Bogan, Afghan War Vets, St. Louis Researchers 
Seek Answers on Head Injuries, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.stltoday.
com/news/local/metro/afghan-war-vets-st-louis-researchers-seek-answers-on-head/article_daaa
0082-4d39-5d0d-899a-7e942109c103.html [http://perma.cc/5459-3C36]; see Gros v. United States, 
232 F. App’x 417, 417 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (denying recovery to service members who 
were exposed to toxic chemicals in the water on a United States military base); Baker v. United 
States, No. CIV.A. 5:05-221-JMH, 2006 WL 1635634, at *1, *6 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2006) (denying 
recovery to a military officer who experienced a traumatic brain injury while participating in a 
military role playing exercise); Katta v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 1134, 1136–37, 1141 (N.D. 
Ill. 1991) (denying recovery to a mother who alleged that her son received inadequate treatment 
for post-traumatic stress disorder subsequent to service); Veloz-Gertrudis, 768 F. Supp. at 39 
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In Baker v. United States, decided by the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Kentucky in 2006, a military police officer was 
injured in the course of a training exercise when the role that officer played 
was misunderstood by others who, seemingly without provocation, reacted 
violently and caused a life-altering traumatic brain injury.128 Making a con-
ventional negligence case based on these facts was a simple matter—and 
yet, the officer was unable to recover in tort in an Article III court.129 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’ 
1991 decision, Katta v. United States,130 offers more complicated facts and 
demonstrates the force of Feres in PTSD cases. Ted Katta served in Vi-
etnam in 1969, was discharged one year later, and returned home to recover 
from numerous injuries. After discharge and during the course of his recov-
ery, he began to show signs of PTSD. The disorder persisted and intensified, 
and over time, he threatened family members, was hospitalized by the VA, 
released, had episodes of uncontrolled screaming, and horrific night terrors. 
Finally, he stepped in front of a train, taking his life. Katta’s mother sued the 
VA alleging that the treatment her son received for his PTSD was wholly 
inappropriate. The court rejected her claim based on Feres, relying on the 
premise that PTSD was incident to Katta’s service, even though the condi-
tion first manifested after he entered civilian life.131 
Like in the case of Katta, the fate of Alexis Veloz-Gertrudis is deeply 
troubling. To say that seaman Veloz-Gertrudis was the victim of a “hazing 
incident” hardly captures the gravity of the occurrence.132 While assigned to 
the U.S.S. Forrestal, Veloz-Gertrudis alleged that “[s]enior crewmen tied 
him up with rope and suspended him upside down from an air pressure 
valve. He was stripped to the waist and grease was smeared over his stom-
ach. Crew members then took turns slapping him on the stomach and 
chest.”133 At one point, “a crew member yanked on the rope by which plain-
tiff was hanging, forcing his ankles over the top of the valve. Veloz-
                                                                                                                           
(denying recovery to a former service member who experienced post-traumatic stress disorder as a 
result of a hazing incident); “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. at 746, 753–54 (re-
jecting claims against the United States involving exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam). 
 128 Baker, 2006 WL 1635634, at *1. 
 129 Id. at *1, *6. 
 130 Katta, 774 F. Supp. at 1136–37, 1141 (appealing a claim denied by the Veterans Admin-
istration). 
 131 Id. at 1141. Although the outcome in Katta is the norm, there are a few cases that have 
found liability possible for misdiagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder coupled with the provi-
sion of improper medication. See, e.g., Wojton v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 2d 722, 733 (S.D. 
Ohio 2002) (allowing the claim to survive because the negligence of the Veterans Administration 
created injuries “separate and distinct from the PTSD itself”). 
 132 See Veloz-Gertrudis, 768 F. Supp. at 38–39 (describing the so-called “hazing incident”).  
 133 Id. 
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Gertrudis heard his ankle ‘pop’ and began screaming with pain . . . .”134 In 
response to the screaming, the crew members “continued to strike him, one 
delivering a series of particularly hard blows . . . .”135 When he threatened 
to report what had happened, he was punched in the head and neck and, at 
some point, a crew member jumped up and down on his back.136 These 
events scarred him physically and, not surprisingly, resulted in PTSD. Yet 
when he sought recovery for the alleged horrific harms he suffered, he was 
barred, because, inter alia, “pursuit of [his] claim would impermissibly in-
trude on military discipline.”137 
It does not take a great leap of logic or a scintilla of disrespect for our 
armed forces (and none is intended) to conclude that the circumstances al-
leged by Veloz-Gertrudis reflect a failure of military discipline.138 The very 
fact that a civil action in tort was unavailable—and thus the perpetrators 
were undeterred—contributes to an environment where this type of miscon-
duct can take place with seeming impunity. 
The cases of egregious conduct just described would be actionable if 
the recommendations in this Article are implemented. Even so, many simple 
negligence cases and even certain intentional tort cases (e.g., emotional dis-
tress) that would be actionable outside of the military would still be blocked 
and compensation limited to the intra-service administrative system. An 
example of what that might look like is Gros v. United States, decided by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 2017, where the 
plaintiff alleged significant harm as a consequence of exposure to contami-
nated water on a military base.139 The Fifth Circuit found that exposure to 
contaminated water in the plaintiff’s home (on a military base) was activity 
“incident to service.”140 Although exposure to contaminated water was the 
consequence of a breach of a reasonable duty of care to maintain an essen-
tial service and probably actionable in the private sector, plaintiff’s harm 
was purely a consequence of life on a military base and thus genuinely inci-
dent to service. Gros would not be actionable were the recommendations in 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Id. at 39. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 39–40. 
 137 Id. at 41. 
 138 Id. at 39. 
 139 Gros, 232 F. App’x at 418; see also “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. at 
753–54 (applying Feres to bar claims against the United States involving exposure to Agent Or-
ange in Vietnam); Hamilton, supra note 83, at 242–43 (suggesting removal of the bar on cases for 
non-combat torts, reckless or knowing acts, and cases of alleged cover-up). 
 140 Gros, 232 F. App’x at 418–19 (noting that Gros was on active duty when the harm oc-
curred, and as such “the Feres doctrine bars suit when the injuries ar[i]se on base while plaintiffs 
were off-duty and attending to personal activities”). 
1514 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1491 
this Article accepted—a simple maintenance failure is not within one of the 
seven proposed exceptions to the FTCA. 
Gros is simply different than cases involving rape, violent beatings, 
clear or gross malpractice, or nonconsensual exposure to toxins.141 The 
FTCA was written to allow for accountability when accountability was es-
sential and would not disrupt the ability of our government to exercise dis-
cretion. It is inconceivable that the discretion Congress had in mind was the 
capacity to subject service members to torture, sexual crimes, or toxins. 
In 1987, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Stanley that the 
Feres doctrine barred a claim against the government for long-term effects 
of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) administered to the plaintiff after he 
consented to participate in a study to test the effectiveness of protective 
gear against chemical warfare.142 The Court found it immaterial that Stan-
ley was deceived and that he was not acting under direct orders of his supe-
riors in taking the LSD, invoking chain-of-command concerns.143 Barring 
cases where nonconsenting and unknowing service members have been 
used as human subjects for experiments hardly seems to advance discipline 
or any other interest used to defend Feres or that is otherwise central to the 
DFE, other than avoidance of accountability.144 
4. Avoiding Feres: A Few Exceptions to the Bar 
Although success rates are low and options few, there are certain in-
stances where Feres may not apply. For example, the Feres doctrine does not 
explicitly bar claims for injunctive (as opposed to monetary) relief, although a 
cursory look at the case law suggests it is unlikely that most courts would 
issue such injunctions.145 A second possibility stems from a few cases involv-
                                                                                                                           
 141 See JONATHAN D. MORENO, UNDUE RISK: SECRET STATE EXPERIMENTS ON HUMANS 13–
52 (2001). 
 142 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671–72. 
 143 Id. at 680 (stating that the officer-subordinate relationship is not crucial under Feres, and 
noting that the Court, instead, applied an “incident to service” test); see also Sweet v. United 
States, 528 F. Supp. 1068, 1075 (D.S.D. 1981), aff’d, 687 F.2d 246 (barring a former serviceman 
from bringing a claim from injuries that arose when the government forced him to take LSD as 
part of an experiment and failed to provide him with the necessary follow-up treatment and care). 
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota in Sweet noted that the injuries sustained 
were “inseparably entwined and directly related to the injury he allegedly sustained while in the 
service.” 528 F. Supp. at 1075. 
 144 See MORENO, supra note 141, at 13–52. 
 145 Compare Speigner v. Alexander, 248 F.3d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
doctrine of non-justiciability extends to cases for injunctive relief, with a few unspecified excep-
tions), with Wigginton v. Centracchio, 205 F.3d 504, 512 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that intra-
military suits alleging constitutional violations, but not seeking damages, are justiciable). 
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ing misconduct by independent contractors retained by the armed forces,146 
where a former service member was harmed by actions of the contractor in-
cluding, in one instance, a claim based on a post-discharge failure to warn.147 
Service members may also be able to sue state governments, as opposed to 
the federal government, although such cases have little or nothing to do with 
accountability under the FTCA.148 
In 1991, in Lutz v. Secretary of the Air Force, decided by the Ninth 
Circuit, three service members broke into the office of Major Marsha Lutz 
and stole documents that disclosed her sexual orientation.149 Major Lutz 
filed suit alleging that the theft was tortious, designed to harm her reputa-
tion, and not incident to service in any way. The Ninth Circuit agreed, rec-
ognizing that, “even Feres concatenations must come to an end.”150 The 
court reasoned that acts by one service member toward another with “no 
conceivable military purpose and . . . not perpetrated during the course of a 
military activity surely are past the reach of Feres.”151 The court found that 
service members should not be able to avoid responsibility simply because 
they wore a military uniform at the time they committed an unquestionably 
wrongful act.152 This case is part of a very limited “private acts” exception 
recognized in Durant v. Neneman, decided by the Tenth Circuit in 1989: 
“[O]ur evolving jurisprudence has created a zone of protection for military 
actors, immunizing [them from] civilian courts. It is our conclusion, how-
ever, that this zone [created by Feres] was never intended to protect the per-
sonal acts of an individual when those acts in no way implicate the function 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016) (acknowledging that both 
sovereign immunity and the government contractor defense make it difficult to pursue claims 
against a government contractor, but holding that “[w]hen a contractor violates both federal law 
and the Government’s explicit instructions . . . no ‘derivative immunity’ shields the contractor 
from suit by persons adversely affected by the violation”); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 
500, 510–12 (1988) (neglecting to directly adopt the Feres doctrine for independent contractors, 
but nonetheless holding that there could be a significant conflict between federal interests and 
state tort laws); Lessin v. Kellogg Brown & Root, No. CIVA H-05-01853, 2006 WL 3940556, at 
*1 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2006) (refusing to dismiss a claim against an independent contractor for 
negligence in inspecting, maintaining, and repairing a truck that injured him, causing a traumatic 
brain injury, while providing a military escort). 
 147 Perez v. United States, No. 09-22201-CIV-JORDAN, 2010 WL 11505508, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 
June 15, 2010) (holding the Feres doctrine did not bar a claim under the FTCA for negligence 
when a post-discharge failure to warn about toxic chemicals in the drinking water caused non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma). 
 148 Trankel v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, 938 P.2d 614, 619 (Mont. 1997) (holding that a for-
mer service member could bring a claim for negligence related to military service because the 
claim was against the state of Montana and not the federal government). 
 149 Lutz v. Sec’y of Air Force, 944 F.2d 1477, 1478 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 150 Id. at 1487 (citations omitted). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
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or authority of the military . . . .”153 Durant states the obvious: “When a 
soldier commits an act that would, in civilian life, make him liable to anoth-
er, he should not be allowed to escape responsibility . . . because those in-
volved were wearing military uniforms. . . . [M]ilitary personnel . . . en-
gaged in distinctly nonmilitary acts . . . should be subject to civil authori-
ty.”154 Of course, the problem is that almost all of the actions described in 
this Article involve misconduct which could be seen as incident to service 
when that term is defined as being virtually anything in any way related to 
our armed forces. 
In 1984, the Fifth Circuit in Adams v. United States reversed a sum-
mary-judgment dismissal of a claim by the family of a service member who 
had a fatal heart attack following a circumcision.155 That plaintiff had not 
received payments from the military, was on indefinite leave, and was 
awaiting the completion of separation paperwork.156 Adams suggests that a 
victim of military medical malpractice may circumvent Feres when the 
plaintiff was not returning to military service.157 Again, although it is tempt-
ing to classify this as an exception, it is not. For example, almost all PTSD 
claims involve veterans who do not intend to return to military service—
and almost all are kept out of Article III courts.158 
In Hall v. United States, decided in 2000 by the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, a widow sued the federal 
government for the wrongful death of her husband (a petty officer), his two 
children, and his two step-children, all of whom died from carbon monox-
ide poisoning in their home on a naval base after the Navy failed to replace 
gas appliances.159 The government moved to dismiss based on Feres but 
lost when the court found that the harm was not incident to the officer’s mil-
itary service because the officer was off-duty and asleep, factors prompting 
the court to consider whether this was personal activity and not incident to 
service.160 This decision does not square with many of the cases already 
discussed, including Gros, involving harm caused by contaminated water 
                                                                                                                           
 153 Durant v. Neneman, 884 F.2d 1350, 1353 (10th Cir. 1989). 
 154 Id. at 1354. 
 155 Adams v. United States, 728 F.2d 736, 737–38 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 156 Id. at 737, 739–40. 
 157 See id. at 740 (emphasizing the service member’s duty status as the controlling factor in 
the analysis). 
 158 Amitis Darabnia, To Care for Him Who Shall Have Borne the Battle: Government’s Re-
sponse to PTSD, 25 FED. CIR. B.J. 453, 480 n.224 (2016) (noting that all appeals for claims denied 
under the FTCA must be filed only with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit). 
 159 Hall v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 2d 825, 826–29 (S.D. Miss. 2000). 
 160 Id. at 829. 
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(used for drinking and bathing) in a home on a base.161 Frankly, although 
“personal activity” does seem a legitimate way to describe behavior not 
“incident to military service,” there is little to suggest it is a reliable distinc-
tion.162 
5. Reluctance to Follow Feres 
That Feres is problematic is hardly debatable—but is the case an incor-
rect reading of the FTCA? Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in United States v. 
Johnson, decided by the Supreme Court in 1987,163 left little doubt of his 
point of view; the case, he wrote, was “wrongly decided.”164 In a dissenting 
opinion regarding the denial of certiorari, Justice Clarence Thomas observed 
that the FTCA simply does not mandate blocking claims across the board of 
service members: “There is no support for this conclusion in the text of the 
statute, and it has the unfortunate consequence of depriving servicemen of 
any remedy when they are injured by the negligence of the Government or 
its employees. I tend to agree with Justice Scalia that ‘Feres was wrongly 
decided . . . .’”165 
Assuming Justices Scalia and Thomas are right, the case is nonetheless 
controlling precedent, prompting courts to search, often in vain, for excep-
tions. For example, in Daniel, after the court barred the claim based on the 
Feres doctrine, it stated that the plaintiff, a dedicated lieutenant, was “ironi-
cally professionally trained to render the same type of care that led to her 
death. If ever there were a case to carve out an exception to the Feres doc-
trine, this is it.”166 Yet, the current understanding of “incident to service” 
precluded the Ninth Circuit from allowing an otherwise legitimate claim 
(from the standpoint of substantive tort law) to go forward.167 
Although Congress did not resolve the matter of tort claims “incident 
to service,” Feres left little room for other interpretations: “We conclude 
that the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for inju-
                                                                                                                           
 161 See Gros, 232 F. App’x at 417 (denying recovery to service members who were exposed 
to toxic chemicals in the water on a United States military base). 
 162 See Warner v. United States, 720 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that activities such 
as shopping might be incident to service if they occur during brief off-duty periods). 
 163 Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 164 Id. (quoting “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. at 1246). 
 165 Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S. 932, 933 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
 166 Daniel, 889 F.3d at 982. 
 167 See Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 1983) (concluding that the Feres 
doctrine barred an otherwise viable claim); see also Zyznar, supra note 77, at 623 n.125 (citing 
Matreale v. N.J. Dep’t of Military & Veterans Affairs, 487 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2007) (discuss-
ing the Feres doctrine’s ripeness for reconsideration)). 
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ries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of ac-
tivity incident to service.”168 Given the enormity of this declaration, it is 
worth exploring whether the justifications on which the Court predicated its 
opinions are convincing.169 
II. THE FERES RATIONALES 
Although the Feres v. United States Court found that the FTCA was 
explicitly designed to hold the government liable, “in the same manner and 
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,”170 the 
Court also found compelling reasons to bar liability when an injury was 
incident to military service. These include the following: (1) “[t]he relation-
ship between the Government and members of its armed forces is ‘distinctly 
federal in character,’”171 (2) an accessible compensation process exists for 
illness and injury, and (3) an understandable concern that the presence of 
many and varied civil tort claims would undermine discipline, chain-of-
command, the willingness to follow lawful orders unquestioningly, and 
more.172 In addition, the Court was concerned that expansive civil liability 
would lead to unequal treatment of service members. These and other ra-
tionales bear scrutiny. 
A. Unique Relationship 
That there is a unique relationship between members of the armed forces 
and the federal government is not debatable.173 It does not follow, however, 
that the existence of that relationship must automatically mean denial of ac-
cess to justice for members of the armed forces in Article III courts. 
It has been suggested that evidence of the unsuitability of civil tort liti-
gation to this unique relationship can be derived from looking at the small 
number of cases and scant case law generated between the adoption of the 
FTCA in 1946 and before the 1950 Feres decision.174 That there is limited 
precedent in this time period is in no way surprising or indicative of much 
of anything for two reasons: first, the government aggressively fought every 
                                                                                                                           
 168 Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. 
 169 Willke, supra note 28, at 276 (referencing the three rationales articulated in Feres). 
 170 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950). 
 171 Id. at 143 (citation omitted). 
 172 Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671–72 (1977); Feres, 340 U.S. 
at 143–44. 
 173 See Paul Figley, In Defense of Feres: An Unfairly Maligned Opinion, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 
393, 434 (2010) [hereinafter Figley, In Defense of Feres] (articulating that no private citizen has 
ever had a relationship comparable to the power the government has over its armed forces). 
 174 Id. 
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case that was brought,175 and second, there was no time for the doctrine to 
evolve and thus no chance to work through various quirks unique to intra-
military litigation. In 1949, the Supreme Court decided Brooks v. United 
States, in which the government argued unsuccessfully that all FTCA claims 
involving activity in any way incident to service should be barred.176 A year 
later, in Feres, this argument succeeded, notwithstanding the fact that, as 
Justice Thomas later noted, the FTCA says nothing to explicitly support this 
conclusion.177 
If any conclusion is to be drawn from the limited litigation history pri-
or to 1950 and the almost nonexistent precedent thereafter, it is that in the 
absence of the potent deterrent effect of tort law,178 there has been in the 
military an epidemic of sexual assault,179 significant unchecked acts of 
medical malpractice,180 and impermissible physical abuse.181 It is no won-
                                                                                                                           
 175 See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949) (indicating that the government 
moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s tort actions on the grounds that the plaintiffs were service mem-
bers at the time of the alleged injuries); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1949), 
aff’d, 340 U.S. 135 (holding that the FTCA was not designed to allow recovery by soldiers en-
gaged in military service); Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 708 (D. Md. 1948) (stating, 
similarly, that the FTCA did not allow recovery from torts arising connected to a service mem-
ber’s military service). The government’s argument in each of these cases was not that the gov-
ernmental actors’ behavior conformed with due care, but rather that the government was immune. 
See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50; Feres, 177 F.2d at 537; Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 708. 
 176 Brooks, 337 U.S. at 50. 
 177 See Lanus v. United States, 570 U.S. 932, 933 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (noting a complete lack of support for the “incident to service” exception in the text 
of the FTCA). 
 178 See supra note 113–115 and accompanying text. 
 179 See Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 376–77 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming the district court’s 
dismissal, and thus rejecting a sexual assault victim’s claims, by stating: “we do not take lightly 
the severity of plaintiffs’ suffering or the harm done by sexual assault and retaliation in our mili-
tary[,] . . . [b]ut the existence of grievous wrongs does not free the judiciary to authorize any and 
all suits that might seem just”); Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 512 (4th Cir. 2013) (denying 
relief sought by a victim of sexual assault in the military, occurring on military premises, because 
civil liability would adversely affect military discipline); see also Sexual Assaults in the Military: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pers. of the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong. 15–18 (2013) 
(statement of Rebekah Havrilla, Former Sergeant, U.S. Army) (providing sworn congressional 
testimony setting forth a harrowing narrative of rape and sexual abuse in the military); Alexandra 
Lohman, Silence of the Lambs: Giving Voice to the Problem of Rape and Sexual Assault in the 
United States Armed Forces, 10 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 230, 232 (2015) (describing nonconsen-
sual sexual contact as a “prevalent feature” of military service); Kelsey L. Campbell, Note, Pro-
tecting Our Defenders: The Need to Ensure Due Process for Women in the Military Before 
Amending the Selective Service Act, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 115, 116 (2017) (reporting that 
servicewomen are more likely to be “raped by fellow servicemen than to be killed by adversaries 
in combat”); Stella Cernak, Note, Sexual Assault and Rape in the Military: The Invisible Victims 
of International Gender Crimes at the Front Lines, 22 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 207, 212 (2015) 
(arguing that sexual assault within the military is a widespread human rights issue). 
 180 See Turley, supra note 36, at 43 (“Military medical malpractice has long been a subject of 
intense criticism. This record may reflect the absence of malpractice as a deterrent in the military 
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der that even judicial conservatives (namely, Justices Scalia and Thomas) 
took the position that Feres was a mistake from the outset.182 
The nature of the unique relationship that service members have with 
the country they serve is potent, suffused with mandates of command and 
order, discipline and responsibility, a commitment to country, a respect for 
rules, regulations, statutes, and, of course, the UCMJ. A lack of accountabil-
ity for overt wrongdoing is found nowhere in that set of critical obligations 
and values. 
B. Sufficient Alternative Remedies 
A second rationale for Feres is the availability of existing remedies with-
in the system of military justice.183 Service members, the Court noted, were 
“already well provided for” under the Veteran’s Benefit Act, a compensation 
scheme providing funds to those who are injured incident to military service 
regardless of fault.184 The argument is that service members are better off be-
cause (1) there is no obligation to prove fault, (2) any needed medical care is 
free, and (3) there are generous insurance, retirement, and other general bene-
fits “outside of the tort arena.”185 Arguably, allowing those with such benefits 
to recover in an Article III court could be seen as dual recovery or unjust en-
richment and create an “uneven system for compensating troops.”186 Moreo-
ver, the “simple, certain, and uniform” compensation system results in “re-
                                                                                                                           
medical system due to the application of the Feres doctrine. While early cases did allow recovery 
for injuries to family members of service members, the courts have largely cut off even that ele-
ment of deterrence by extending Feres to cover such cases.”); Melvani, supra note 18, at 398 
(arguing that Feres has rendered service members “second-class citizens, whose rights fall below 
even those of the nation’s criminals . . . [and that] the Feres bar undermines the quality of 
healthcare provided to the nation’s military forces by preventing accountability for egregious 
mistakes and shortcomings in medical treatment”). 
 181 See Veloz-Gertrudis v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (involving a 
brutal beating of a service member as part of a compulsory hazing exercise). 
 182 See, e.g., Lanus, 570 U.S. at 933 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (includ-
ing a complete rejection of the Feres doctrine). 
 183 Feres, 340 U.S. at 140. 
 184 Id.; see Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp., 431 U.S. at 671–72 (describing the Veterans’ Benefits 
Act as a substitute for tort liability). 
 185 Figley, In Defense of Feres, supra note 173, at 427; see Leo Shane III, The Argument for 
Keeping the Feres Doctrine, STARS & STRIPES (Apr. 2, 2012), https://www.stripes.com/news/the-
argument-for-keeping-the-feres-doctrine-1.173370 [http://perma.cc/58RP-5PLY] (noting the gov-
ernment’s argument that service members are duly compensated for on-duty injuries through the 
provision of military benefits). 
 186 Shane, supra note 185. 
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coveries [that] compare extremely favorably with those provided” by other 
federal compensation schemes, such as workers’ compensation.187 
Detractors of the current system assert that it is neither sufficient in 
amount nor reliable enough to cover the harms that service members and their 
families experience and certainly insufficient to produce a deterrent to future 
violations.188 Particularly in post-discharge compensation cases, veterans face 
significant barriers.189 In fact, there is simply no basis to argue and no record 
to support the proposition that the compensation system available within the 
military is comparable to the civil justice system in terms of the amount of 
individual judgments, deterrent effect, and fairness. The question is whether 
adding the potential for access to Article III courts in highly limited and well-
defined circumstances would do more harm than good. 
To be sure, mechanisms for discipline, strict adherence to lawful or-
ders, and respect for the chain-of-command are essential. That those critical 
components of our armed forces are undermined by making the government 
civilly accountable in select cases involving unquestionably wrongful con-
duct simply does not ring true and is not justified by an imperfect adminis-
trative and internal system of compensation.190 
The premise of this particular rationale is that an administrative com-
pensation system within our armed forces (broadly defined) would be frus-
                                                                                                                           
 187 Feres, 340 U.S. at 143–45; see Froelich, supra note 18, at 716 (emphasizing that the presi-
dent has exclusive authority over military rights, duties, responsibilities, regulations and proce-
dures). Circuit courts have expressed concern that “judicial meddling in such instances would 
violate the separation of powers” and further that “civilian courts are ‘inherently unsuitable’ and 
incompetent to oversee such matters.” Froelich, supra note 18, at 728 (quoting Kreis v. Sec’y of 
Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 188 Major Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine, 192 
MIL. L. REV. 1, 45–47 (2007) (arguing that the veterans’ compensation system may require litiga-
tion, and further, it is inefficient, slow, not always accurate, and not as generous as the Feres 
Court might have believed); O’Conor, supra note 127, at 274 (arguing that the benefits available 
through veteran statutes do not adequately cover life-long impairments). 
 189 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-260, DOD HEALTH: ACTIONS NEEDED 
TO ENSURE POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY ARE CONSID-
ERED IN MISCONDUCT SEPARATIONS 12 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684608.pdf [http://
perma.cc/E3QG-74VM] (examining the numbers of service members discharged for misconduct 
who have trouble accessing certain benefits and services); Clinic Files Class Action on Behalf of 
Marine Corps Vets with PTSD, YALE LAW SCH. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/
news/clinic-files-class-action-behalf-marine-corps-vets-ptsd [http://perma.cc/H3PU-4V4R] (de-
scribing the filing of a class-action lawsuit on behalf of thousands of Navy and Marine Corps 
veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan who developed post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental 
health conditions during military service but received a less-than-honorable discharge). 
 190 See Compensation for Victims of Military Malpractice: Hearing Before the Military Pers. 
and Comp. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 100th Cong. 65 (1987) (statement of H. 
Lawrence Garrett III, General Counsel, Department of Defense) (“The Department believes that 
amendment of the Military Claims Act . . . may very well provide . . . a solution.”). 
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trated or cannot co-exist when a small number of victims of overt wrongdo-
ing have access, in limited circumstances, to civil justice in Article III 
courts. First, there is no empirical evidence to support this justification. 
Second, the idea that a victim would be unjustly enriched wrongfully pre-
supposes that courts would permit a person to be awarded twice for the 
same costs and that the damages one would seek and receive in an Article 
III court are the same one would receive in an administrative tribunal. Pre-
sumably, an administrative award for costs or damages could be off-set 
against a judgment for those same costs and damages. Alternatively, it is 
possible to avoid the unjust enrichment problem by providing a service 
member an opt-out option from the military administrative compensation 
system to pursue a civil tort claim, as is done with intentional torts in cer-
tain workers’ compensation systems191 and a number of other administrative 
compensation programs.192 
C. Chain-of-Command and Military Discipline 
Respect for and adherence to rules, discipline, tradition, train-
ing/conditioning regimes, and the chain-of-command is vitally important to 
the effective and efficient operation of our armed forces. The limitations in 
Feres are driven, in meaningful part, by the concern that exposure to liability 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See Grammatico v. Indus. Comm’n, 90 P.3d 211, 213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that it 
is possible to opt out of workers’ compensation and pursue remedies in tort based on ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 23-906(A)). Several cases provide examples of allowing a worker to opt out of workers’ 
compensation when they are victims of an intentional tort. See, e.g., Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics 
Corp., 698 A.2d 838, 840 (Conn. 1997) (discussing how the exclusivity bar of the Workers’ Com-
pensation Act may be overcome by an intentional tort claim); Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 
482 (La. 1981) (discussing this “intentional act” exception); Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
& Co., 501 A.2d 505, 510 (N.J. 1985) (discussing the limits of the exclusivity bar); Woodson v. 
Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222, 224 (N.C. 1991) (considering how the exclusivity bar of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act may be overcome by an intentional tort claim ); Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 
127 P.3d 572, 579 (Okla. 2005) (recognizing an intentional tort exception to workers’ compensa-
tion exclusivity); VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Prods., 334 N.W.2d 874, 877 (S.D. 1983) (dis-
cussing this “intentional acts exception”). 
 192 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the 
VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1673 (2015) (discussing the Vaccine Act opt-out option found at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11(a)(2)(A)(i), 300aa-21(b), pertaining to retention of vaccine claimant’s right 
to pursue civil tort options); COMCAST SET-TOP BOX SETTLEMENT (2019), https://settopbox
settlement.com/ [https://perma.cc/Q3W6-YS3D] (describing a program that provides subscribers 
the option to receive limited funds from settlement, or, alternatively, to opt out and initiate inde-
pendent litigation); SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND, https://www.vcf.gov/ [http://
perma.cc/LXS4-YC9Y] (creating a fund to pay victims of the 9/11 terrorist disaster in which vic-
tims have the option to take the settlement distribution or opt out and litigate independently). 
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would undermine those vital aspects of military life.193 The argument under-
lying Feres is that civil tort litigation, “if generally permitted, would involve 
the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline 
and effectiveness.”194 The discipline and the very nature of the command 
structure would “get bogged down in lengthy and possibly frivolous lawsuits 
[that may ] substantially disrupt the military mission, by requiring officers . . . 
to testify in court as to their decisions and actions . . . [and taking] scarce re-
sources away from compelling military needs to avoid legal actions.”195 
Notwithstanding the important concerns expressed above, there is no 
concrete data, studies, or even any documented history to support the prop-
osition that providing access to justice in Article III courts to address egre-
gious misconduct means undoing the UCMJ, rules related to discipline, 
training regimens, or, for that matter, any rules and regulations governing 
service members.  
Access to justice means only that there would be a remedy in a court 
of law for isolated, undeniably unacceptable misconduct clearly not essen-
tial to military operations, order, or discipline. Nothing in the structure of 
the rules and regulations governing the armed forces need change if service 
members are given this form of access to justice in Article III courts. Undo-
ing Feres is not an invitation for a free-for-all, for chaos, for the end of tra-
dition, or anything of the sort. Being accountable for discernible wrongdo-
ing does not equate with the behavioral Armageddon and mayhem Feres 
devotees fear. The converse seems more realistic: systemic avoidance of 
liability for clearly actionable behavior shields wrongdoers, fosters distrust 
and resentment, enshrines unequal treatment, and nurtures a culture of se-
crecy. 
On the more pointed question of chain-of-command, would service 
members regularly question the judgment of their superiors in the absence 
of Feres? If so, the doctrine should not change.196 There is no demonstrated 
reason to believe, however, that long-standing military practices, including 
unquestioned compliance with all lawful orders, would vanish simply be-
cause a very small number of people who engage in overtly unacceptable 
                                                                                                                           
 193 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 141–42 (“[N]o private individual has power to conscript or mobi-
lize a private army with such authorities over persons as the Government vests in echelons of 
command”). 
 194 Regan v. Starcraft Marine, LLC, 524 F.3d 627, 634 (5th Cir. 2008); see Dawson, supra 
note 16, at 488 (claiming that the “often maligned ‘military discipline’ rationale, standing alone, is 
sufficient to support the Feres doctrine”). 
 195 Shane, supra note 185 (referring, inter alia, to comments made by the Solicitor General). 
 196 Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp., 431 U.S. at 671–72 (suggesting that adherence to the mandates 
of the chain-of-command would be placed in jeopardy if service members were free to bring civil 
actions in tort without any limitations); Feres, 340 U.S. at 141, 143–44 (suggesting the same). 
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misconduct are held accountable for their actions. Making the recommenda-
tion to amend the FTCA and end the Feres bar is accompanied by the deep-
ly held belief197 in the essential nature of the kind of training and discipline 
that has characterized our military since its very beginning.198 
The discipline/command arguments are not complicated: (1) holding 
wrongdoers accountable does not undermine discipline; (2) holding wrong-
doers accountable does not cause the collapse of the chain-of-command or 
otherwise invite insubordination; (3) findings of civil liability in tort make it 
less likely that unlawful, unreasonable, and indefensible risks to human 
welfare will take place in the future;199 (4) if Feres did not bar recovery, the 
frequency of isolated controversial or injurious practices might be cur-
tailed;200 (5) given the exposure and fiscal potential of tort liability, lifting 
the Feres bar would make it more likely the federal government would 
acknowledge wrongdoing rather than fight tooth and nail the very existence 
of responsibility for actions that cause harm;201 (6) subjecting the federal 
government to the light of day for systemic misconduct including invidious 
                                                                                                                           
 197 The conclusions in this section draw more heavily on the author’s personal experiences 
noted briefly at the outset of the Article. 
 198 This is not a debatable point, but it is discussed regularly. See Adam Taylor, Why Is Disci-
pline Important in a Military?, QUORA (2017), https://www.quora.com/Why-is-discipline-important-
in-a-military [http://perma.cc/B9YR-A842]; Strict Behavior Standards for Military Personnel, MILI-
TARY.COM, https://www.military.com/veteran-jobs/security-clearance-jobs/strict-behavior-standards-
for-military-personnel.html [https://perma.cc/2455-LMTT] (discussing the strict behavior standards 
for service members). 
 199 See generally MORENO, supra note 141 (providing a history of the U.S. military’s use of 
human subjects in atomic, biological, and chemical warfare experiments). 
 200 See Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1983) (barring civil liability in a 
radiation-exposure case where not only was a service member a victim, but his spouse and child 
were, as well); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 1979) (blocking service mem-
bers’ claims based on Feres despite a commanding officer’s awareness of risk from exposure to 
deadly radiation); Hall v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 2d 825, 829 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (holding that 
the widow of a petty officer could recover for her husband’s death and the death of their children 
from carbon monoxide poisoning in their home at a naval base). 
 201 Gros v. United States, 232 F. App’x 417, 417 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (denying recov-
ery to service members who were exposed to toxic chemicals in the water on a United States mili-
tary base). The federal government also fought successfully all claims involving exposure to diox-
in (Agent Orange) in Vietnam, among other claims. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 
F. Supp. 740, 746, 753–54 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (barring claims for exposure to Agent Orange); Dill, 
supra note 79, at 80 (explaining how courts have barred claims where exposure to chemicals or 
radiation has led to birth deformities); see also Molly Kokesh, Comment, Applying the Feres Doc-
trine to Prenatal Injury Cases After Ortiz v. United States, 93 DENVER L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1 
(2016) (discussing the genesis test for the “in utero” exception) (citing Ortiz v. United States ex 
rel. Evans Army Cmty. Hosp., 786 F.3d 817 (10th Cir. 2015)), http://www.denverlawreview.org/
dlr-onlinearticle/2016/5/6/applying-the-feres-doctrine-to-prenatal-injury-cases-after-o.html [https://
perma.cc/5NV8-Z75P]. 
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discrimination should have a powerful corrective effect;202 and (7) when 
there are no consequences for tortious misconduct, there is no meaningful 
deterrence for repetition of that same act.203 
It is simply illogical to assume that discipline and respect for authority 
are optimized in a setting where accountability is circumscribed. It is more 
logical to assume that the presence of unchecked egregious misconduct ad-
vancing no service-related goal is the consequence of insufficient accounta-
bility and deterrence. 
D. The “Feres Is a Fair Interpretation of the FTCA” Rationale 
The FTCA, like most statutes, has gaps. But the Court in Feres was not 
engaged in judicial “gap filling” of an ambiguous statute.204 The Court was 
legislating. It is one thing for the Court to give clarity to a statute. It is quite 
another to craft a massive exception to liability in a statute designed to cre-
ate accountability, blocking countless claims, when the statute on which 
those claims would be based, the FTCA, does not do so.205 The idea that 
Congress was unaware of the importance of specifying exceptions to the 
FTCA when it opened the door to tort liability is indefensible. Exemptions 
or exceptions to the statute (e.g., the DFE), and the matter of how service 
members would be impacted was considered (e.g., the addition of the word 
“combatant” in House debates).206 A blanket bar of liability would have 
been a political decision of great moment—but it did not happen. 
When Congress passed the FTCA and waived sovereign immunity, it 
could have easily blocked the vast majority of civil tort claims emanating 
from the single largest branch of government, the Department of De-
fense.207 It could have easily done so—but it did not. Seen in that light, 
                                                                                                                           
 202 See David Saul Schwartz, Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed Reform 
of the Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L.J. 992, 1015–16 (1986) (“[C]ases involving particularly egre-
gious or widespread military misconduct are more appropriately resolved by civilian courts.”). 
 203 See Popper, supra note 23, at 181 (arguing that deterrence is a “real and present virtue of 
the tort system”). 
 204 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(explaining that Congress sometimes leaves interpretative “gaps” in legislation to allow adminis-
trative agencies to insert their expertise).  
 205 See Astley, supra note 56, at 195 (“An analysis of the FTCA legislative history does not 
clearly indicate whether Congress intended to exclude military personnel from FTCA protection. 
From the Act’s history, however, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended servicemem-
bers to be covered.”). 
 206 Id. at 196.  
 207 The Executive Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/1600/
executive-branch [http://perma.cc/CBZ9-3UF2] (“The Department of Defense is the largest gov-
ernment agency, with more than 1.3 million men and women on active duty, nearly 700,000 civil-
ian personnel, and 1.1 million citizens who serve in the National Guard and Reserve forces.”). 
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Feres is not just overly broad,208 but also an incorrect interpretation of the 
FTCA and thus wrongly decided.209 
To be fair, there is thoughtful and compelling scholarship defending 
the Court’s decision as consistent with the FTCA.210 There is also the fact 
that the Court crafted limitations on civil actions in Feres as the best way to 
solve what it perceived as the problem of maintaining discipline and the 
chain-of-command, both understandable and undeniably valid goals. Re-
gardless of the motivation when the case was decided, the immunity that 
Feres spawned has played a role in the aforementioned epidemic of sexual 
assault,211 inexcusable negligence,212 and more. Quite obviously, these ac-
tions have not been deterred, nor should they be considered “incident to 
service.”213 Without a congressional imperative in the FTCA on service-
related harms, the Court, for legitimate reasons, took a shot at setting public 
policy to engage in the kind of “judicial law making” often condemned,214 
                                                                                                                           
 208 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2012) (providing the language of the FTCA); Brou, supra note 188, 
at 60–72 (arguing for an alternative to the Feres doctrine). 
 209 See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that 
Feres was “wrongly decided”). 
 210 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143–44 (describing the alternative methods of recovery as one of 
the rationales behind the adoption of its non-justiciability doctrine); Figley, In Defense of Feres, 
supra note 173, at 443 (explaining Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. and reiterating the reasoning 
behind the Feres doctrine). 
 211 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 212 See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671, 683–84 (1987) (concerning a claim aris-
ing from a serviceman’s long-term exposure to LSD as part of a military experiment); Veloz-
Gertrudis, 768 F. Supp. at 39 (concerning a claim arising out of a violent military hazing exer-
cise); Sweet v. United States, 528 F. Supp. 1068, 1070 (D.S.D. 1981), aff’d, 687 F.2d 246 (8th 
Cir. 1982) (concerning a claim by a former serviceman that the government forced him to take 
LSD as part of an experiment and failed to provide him with the necessary follow-up treatment 
and care); Campbell, supra note 179, at 138–40, 152–53 (describing how servicewomen have 
unsuccessfully tried to establish causes of action for negligence contributing to the “military cul-
ture of tolerance for sexual crimes”). 
 213 See Klay v. Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 758 F.3d 369 (“[B]eing 
victimized by a sexual assault cannot possibly be considered to be an ‘activity’ incident to military 
service.”). 
 214 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“The Imperial Judiciary lives. It is instructive to compare this Nie-
tzschean vision of us unelected, life-tenured judges . . . with the somewhat more modest role envi-
sioned for these lawyers by the Founders.”); Greg Jones, Proper Judicial Activism, 14 REGENT U. L. 
REV. 141, 143 (2001) (“[J]udicial activism is any occasion where a court intervenes and strikes down 
a piece of duly enacted legislation.”); Turley, supra note 36, at 89 (stating that the Feres doctrine 
“stands as one of the most extreme examples of judicial activism in the history of the Supreme 
Court”); Trent Franks, Franks Denounces Ninth Circuit Ruling Against Parental Rights, VOTE 
SMART (Nov. 4, 2005), https://votesmart.org/public-statement/134997/franks-denounces-ninth-
circuit-ruling-against-parental-rights#.XJOLUa3Mwcg [http://perma.cc/ZP8G-PB3F] (“This is 
just the latest outrage to come from the Ninth Circuit, which has become the poster child for judi-
cial activism.”). 
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violating one of the most basic tenets of separation of powers.215 Over time, 
Feres has left countless victims without full remediation, wrongdoers with-
out accountability, and foreseeable injurious misconduct unchecked. 
E. The Unequal Treatment Rationale 
Another rationale underlying Feres was the concern that access to Ar-
ticle III courts in select and unpredictable cases would result in unequal 
treatment of service members.216 Although it is important for similarly situ-
ated service members to be treated equally, and although equal treatment is 
the promise of the entire justice system,217 fear of unequal treatment is just 
that—a fear. Again, there is nothing in the Court’s opinion that demon-
strates just how access to justice is discriminatory—because it is not. That 
an injured person seeks a remedy in a court of law hardly seems a basis to 
cry foul. 
There is one other aspect to equal treatment. Military justice pursuant 
to the UCMJ is remarkably efficient and fair. Yet in any military process of 
any kind, rank and regard for the command structure are appropriately of 
consequence. Although rank does not make one above the law under the 
UCMJ, rank matters in the way parties are addressed and treated. This is not 
in any way a criticism—the system of military justice is a stunning example 
of how, in a unique setting, an enviable quantum of justice can take place. 
With multiple and potent interests in play, the system strikes an almost mi-
raculous balance between disciplined efficiency and fairness. That said, it is 
                                                                                                                           
 215 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court—October Term 2009 Foreword: Conservative 
Judicial Activism, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 866–67 (2011) (“Judicial activism is a grave threat 
to the rule of law because unaccountable federal judges are usurping democracy, ignoring the 
Constitution and its separation of powers, and imposing their personal opinions upon the public.”); 
David N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract During the 
Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 250–51 (2009) (“The basic vice of judicial activism 
. . . is that it violates the fundamental American constitutional principle of separation of powers 
. . . .”); Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in Quantifying the Qualita-
tive, 74 TENN. L. REV. 567, 581 (2007) (“[J]udicial activism [is at odds with basic notions of] 
separation-of-powers principles because the Constitution renders such authority to Congress rather 
than the federal judiciary . . . .”). 
 216 See Shane, supra note 185 (arguing that not only would such claims affect the concept of 
equality of treatment for all troops in the armed services, but that without imposition of limits, 
“the armed forces would get bogged down in lengthy and possibly frivolous lawsuits”). 
 217 See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963) (discussing the possibility of une-
qual treatment and litigation by prisoners and rejecting the contention outright by stating: “we 
conclude that the prison system will not be disrupted by the application of Connecticut law in one 
case and Indiana law in another to decide whether the Government should be liable to a prisoner 
for the negligence of its employees”). 
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simply untrue to say that the justice available to service members through 
this system is no different than that which takes place in an Article III court. 
In civil, non-military courts, rank does not dictate credibility assump-
tions, respect, or deference. The judge is not an officer in the same branch 
of the service as the parties before the court.218 There is no convening au-
thority (often a commanding officer in military courts) with special authori-
ty to activate the proceeding or review the outcome of a case. Civil courts, 
by design and tradition, prize equal justice under law, a level playing field, 
and compassion. Those notions, particularly equal justice under law, are the 
hallmarks of the entire system of justice.219 It cannot be that the possibility 
of a fair and open trial where all stand on equal footing is to be avoided be-
cause it reveals undue advantage and unequal treatment. 
The Feres Court rationalized its decision based on legitimate fears. 
Over the next sixty-eight years, however, those fears did not manifest. In-
stead, the wrongs described in this Article have. Harkening back to undoc-
umented fears without evidence that they will ever occur is not an accepta-
ble rationale to justify the deprivation of rights explicit in Feres.220 
III. ANALOGIES TO OTHER FEDERAL PROGRAMS 
To see if the requirements imposed by Feres v. United States on ser-
vice members are the norm for federal employees, it is worth looking at a 
few other federal agency programs. Several large programs involving gov-
ernment employees and others have somewhat similar limits on access to 
                                                                                                                           
 218 That cases involving the armed forces can end up in non-military courts is not a novel 
concept. See generally Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975) (anticipating cases origi-
nating in the armed forces but finding an exhaustion requirement for such cases); Parker v. Levy, 
417 U.S. 733 (1974) (conducting a habeas corpus review of court martial); Parisi v. Davidson, 405 
U.S. 34 (1972) (considering a habeas corpus petition from a serviceman who claimed that the 
Army unjustly denied his application for discharge as a conscientious objector); O’Callahan v. 
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (conducting a habeas corpus review of court martial). 
 219 See The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., https://
www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx [http://perma.cc/DWC9-UB2P] (stating that the 
words “equal justice under law” express “the ultimate responsibility” of the Supreme Court). 
 220 Fear of what might happen should not be the basis for denying our service members so 
fundamental a set of rights—or any set of rights. For example, we condemn legislation that consti-
tutes a prior restraint on speech even knowing that some speech may, in the end, be horrific and 
injurious. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 539 (1976) (holding that prior re-
straints on speech that restrict news and commentaries are inherently unconstitutional). We cher-
ish the notion of a presumption of innocence in criminal cases even knowing that we run the risk 
of acquitting those who have committed crimes. See generally William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of 
Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329 (1995) (deconstructing innocence and its place in American 
jurisprudence). We do so, predicated on our belief in the strength of our system of justice, not on 
fear that the system might fail. A fear-driven legal system is an open-ended invitation to totalitari-
anism. 
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Article III courts. None of those programs, however, have seen widespread 
unchecked discrimination or the same levels of sexual assault or multiple 
instances of egregious malpractice. Moreover, although limiting injured 
government employees or others to administrative relief is not unusual, 
Feres has resulted in our service members, who are the best among us, get-
ting the least protection from tortious misconduct. 
A. Federal Employees Outside of the Armed Forces: FECA 
There is a limitation on access to Article III courts for federal employ-
ees via the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA).221 Their claims, 
more often than not, are pursued administratively222 (much like workers’ 
compensation claims in the private sector).223 As the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained, “[f]ederal employees’ injuries that 
are compensable under FECA cannot be compensated under other federal 
remedial statutes, including the Federal Tort Claims Act.”224 
The difficulties federal employees face bringing civil actions in tort 
based on the FTCA225 surfaced in Ezekiel v. Michael, decided by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1995.226 In that case, a 
federal employee sued a resident VA physician after an injection with a con-
taminated hypodermic needle.227 Because the physician was a federal em-
ployee acting in the scope of his employment, the plaintiff’s remedies were 
limited to the FECA.228 
The FECA provides for wage loss compensation, medical care, reha-
bilitation, attendant’s allowance, and survivors’ benefits.229 As with work-
ers’ compensation and cases barred by Feres, the FECA is, for the most 
part, an exclusive remedy.230 In making the FECA the sole remedy, Con-
                                                                                                                           
 221 5 U.S.C. § 8101–8193 (2012); 20 C.F.R. §§ 10, 20 (2018). 
 222 5 U.S.C. §§ 8103–8193. The statute specifies that compensation claims are to be delivered 
to the Secretary of Labor or to an individual designated by regulation. Id. § 8121. 
 223 See Workers’ Compensation, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/
workcomp [http://perma.cc/BY4A-N6PU] (providing an overview of the Office of Workers’ 
Compensation Programs, which administers the workers’ compensation programs). 
 224 Wallace v. United States, 669 F.2d 947, 951 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing United States v. Dem-
ko, 385 U.S. 149, 151 n.1 (1966)). 
 225 See id. (noting that a federal employee cannot file a claim under the FTCA if it is possible 
that the FECA applies). 
 226 Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 227 Id. at 895. 
 228 Id. 
 229 HOWARD L. GRAHAM, FED. EMPLOYEES COMP. ACT PRAC. GUIDE § 1:1 (2d ed. 2017). 
 230 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c); see Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 193–94 
(1983) (discussing FECA’s exclusive-liability provision); Williamson v. United States, 862 F.3d 
577, 583 (6th Cir. 2017) (referencing the same (citing Spinelli v. Goss, 446 F.3d 159, 161 (D.C. 
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gress intended to “limit the government’s liability to a low enough level so 
that all injured employees c[ould] be paid some reasonable level of com-
pensation for a wide range of job-related injuries, regardless of fault.”231 
Federal employees have “the right to receive immediate, fixed benefits, re-
gardless of fault and without need for litigation from their federal employer, 
but in return they lose the right to sue the government.”232 Claims of dis-
crimination by federal employees, including sexual harassment, however, 
may be heard in an Article III court, unlike similar claims in the armed 
forces.233 In addition, FECA claims can be judicially reviewed in an Article 
III court when there is (1) a cognizable constitutional claim, and (2) an ex-
plicit statutory violation.234 No such exceptions exist for service members. 
B. Federal Inmates 
In 1963, in United States v. Muniz, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of whether a prisoner could recover under the FTCA for injuries 
sustained while in prison.235 Although such claims might affect prison dis-
cipline, the Court found the parties presented no evidence that tort recovery 
would affect discipline.236 Muniz, however, did not result in anything re-
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 2006))); Elman v. United States, 173 F.3d 486, 492 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing to exclusive-
liability provision to bar a plaintiff from bringing a claim under the FTCA as well as the FECA); 
Votteler v. United States, 904 F.2d 128, 130–31 (2d Cir. 1990) (describing the FECA as the “ex-
clusive remedy” for work-related injuries sustained by federal employees); Wilder v. United 
States, 873 F.2d 285, 288–89 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (discussing the FECA’s exclusive-
liability provision); Villanova v. United States, 851 F.2d 1, 7 n.24 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that 
Congress explicitly rejected the so-called “dual capacity doctrine” in the FECA); see also Lance v. 
United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (proposing that the FECA is an 
exclusive remedy). 
 231 Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732, 734 (D.C. 1979). 
 232 Patnaude v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 643, 650 (D. Del. 2007) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c)) 
(limiting the rights of service members as well as civilians doing business with the military to 
pursue claims for injuries in Article III courts). 
 233 See generally Kristin Sommers Czubkowski, Comment, Equal Opportunity: Federal Em-
ployees’ Right to Sue on Title VII and Tort Claims, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1841 (2013) (discussing 
federal employees’ right to sue their employers in Title VII actions). 
 234 Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 238–39 (1968) (review-
ing a FECA claim involving a statutory violation); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188–89 (1958) 
(reviewing the same); Staacke v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 841 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1988) (review-
ing a FECA claim involving a constitutional challenge); Rodrigues v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 
1348 (9th Cir. 1985) (reviewing the same). 
 235 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150 (1963). 
 236 Id. at 163 (“It is also possible that litigation will damage prison discipline, as the Govern-
ment most vigorously argues. However, we have been shown no evidence that these possibilities 
have become actualities in the many States allowing suits against jailers, or the smaller number 
allowing recovery directly against the States themselves.”); Melvani, supra note 18, at 429–30 
(citing id. at 162–63). 
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motely resembling regular access to Article III courts. Instead, Congress 
passed the Inmate Accident Compensation Act (IACA),237 establishing an 
administrative compensation system for federal inmates or their dependents 
for work-related injuries occurring during incarceration.238 Pursuant to 
IACA, the Federal Prison Industries Board maintains the Prison Industries 
Fund as the sole means of compensation for inmates,239 effectively barring 
inmates from maintaining an FTCA suit.240 In deciding the exclusivity of 
the IACA, the Supreme Court echoed the reasoning related to the FECA 
(and Feres): “[W]here there is a compensation statute that reasonably and 
fairly covers a particular group of workers, it presumably is the exclusive 
remedy to protect that group.”241 Parenthetically, the claims of federal pris-
on employees, as opposed to inmates, were discussed by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1992 in Wilson v. United States, 
and held to be outside IACA and limited to the FECA.242 
Looking at basic civil rights, members of the armed forces, unlike oth-
er federal employees or even convicted felons, do not have the option to 
bring a § 1983 civil rights action243 or Bivens claim.244 Wilson found that 
prisoners, on the other hand, have those options. As the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated in its 2009 decision in Smith v. Unit-
ed States, “the statutory scheme lack[s] requisite procedural safeguards for 
the prisoner’s constitutional rights, the statute possesse[s] very little deter-
rent value, and there [is] no explicit indication from Congress [barring] 
Bivens action[s].”245 The same statutory deficiencies are applicable to ser-
                                                                                                                           
 237 18 U.S.C.A. § 4126 (West 2018). 
 238 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, 2 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 8:22 (5th ed. 2017). 
 239 18 U.S.C.A. § 4126. 
 240 See Demko, 385 U.S. at 152 (describing the IACA as the exclusive remedy for inmates); 
MUSHLIN, supra note 238, at § 8:22. 
 241 Demko, 385 U.S. at 151–52 (citing Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959)); see 
Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427, 438 (1952) (reasoning that FECA is an exclusive reme-
dy).  
 242 Wilson v. United States, 959 F.2d 12, 13 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 243 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see Koprowski v. Baker, 822 F.3d 248, 261 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(“The IACA does not displace this otherwise available [Bivens] claim just because the alleged 
unconstitutional conduct occurred in the context of a prison workplace injury.”); Smith v. United 
States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1106 (10th Cir. 2009) (allowing Bivens claims against individuals but bar-
ring Bivens actions against the federal government); Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 637–38 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that Bivens claims are not fully precluded under IACA but courts are cautious 
in extending Bivens without giving careful consideration to the consequences of that action). 
 244 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (involving a civil rights 
claim against what was then the Federal Bureau of Narcotics for a violation of plaintiff’s Fourth 
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search). 
 245 Smith, 561 F.3d at 1102 (citing Bagola, 131 F.3d at 644–45). The Bivens doctrine permits 
a plaintiff to bring a private cause of action against a federal official acting to vindicate certain 
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vice members—and yet, Dean Irwin Chemerinsky’s summation of their civ-
il rights options, or lack thereof, is telling. Unlike federal employees or 
prisoners, “Bivens suits are never permitted for constitutional violations 
arising from military service, no matter how severe the injury or how egre-
gious the rights infringement.”246 This distinction is of consequence when 
considering the range of alleged (unchecked and thus undeterred) acts247 of 
invidious discrimination.248 Finally, unlike service members, an inmate can 
seek judicial review of an IACA decision predicated on a violation of pro-
cedural safeguards or abuse of discretion.249 
C. Longshoremen and Harbor Workers 
The last of the alternate programs assessed is the Longshoremen and 
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), which provides govern-
mental and non-governmental employees disability and death compensation 
for harms sustained on navigable waterways.250 The statute originally cov-
ered “employees in traditional maritime occupations such as longshore 
workers, ship-repairers, shipbuilders or ship-breakers, and harbor construc-
tion workers,” but coverage expanded substantially with the enactment of 
the Defense Base Act (DBA),251 which included those who “work for pri-
vate employers on U.S. military bases or . . . lands used by the U.S. for 
                                                                                                                           
constitutionally protected rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). If Bivens does not 
apply, the plaintiff may pursue an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 
 246 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 117, at 621–22. 
 247 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (providing an instance 
of a private plaintiff bringing an action under Title VII for discrimination and disparate treatment). 
Title VII does not apply directly to the military. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (stating the scope 
of Title VII). Although recent cases have expanded and clarified the reach of Title VII, applicabil-
ity to the military via a civil rights case brought in an Article III court is not part of that change. 
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 248 See J. Stephen Clark, But-For Sex: Equal Protection and the Individual Right to Marry a 
Specific Person Without Regard to Sex, 60 S.D. L. REV. 389, 398 (2015) (discussing the history of 
discrimination in the military); Mary C. Griffin, Note, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title 
VII Remedy for Discrimination in the Military, 96 YALE L.J. 2082, 2084–86 (1987) (detailing the 
history of discrimination); Overview of the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at 
the Military Service Academies, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Pers. of the H. Comm. 
on Armed Servs., 115th Cong. 64 (2017) (statement of Annie Kendzior). 
 249 Johnson v. United States, No. 3:18-CV-00823-MK, 2018 WL 6004659, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 
15, 2018) (“[A]n inmate may seek judicial review of a final IACA decision under the Administra-
tive Procedures Act . . . .”); Peguero v. Unicor Indus., No. CIV.A. 14-2371 RMB, 2014 WL 
1716448, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2014) (stating that an inmate can seek review of an IACA deci-
sion based on “procedural safeguards and assessment for abuse of discretion” (citing Thompson v. 
Fed. Prison Indus., 492 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
 250 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2012). 
 251 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1654 (2012). 
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military purposes outside of the United States,” among others.252 When the 
LHWCA applies, it is an exclusive remedy barring civil tort actions in Arti-
cle III courts pursuant to the FTCA.253 Similar to the FECA, however, if the 
federal court believes there is a “substantial question” regarding whether the 
LHWCA applies to the employee’s claim, it will generally hold the case in 
abeyance.254 The LHWCA is similar to the FECA in that a “third party . . . 
subject to liability for injuries covered under LHWCA may maintain an in-
demnity action against the United States . . . .”255 (something service mem-
bers cannot do). The LHWCA also does not bar discrimination claims 
(again, something that is barred for service members), and LHWCA cases 
are appealable in federal court (not so for service members).256 
Each of these programs reflects the values and trade-off in what has 
been called the “grand bargain” underlying workers’ compensation.257 In 
exchange for foregoing the right to bring a civil action in tort, a person 
gains access to a more simplified administrative no-fault system to address 
the costs of an injury.258 All of the programs, however, except the military 
compensation scheme, allow for discrimination claims in federal court and 
rely on federal courts to determine if the various compensation programs 
are applicable. Although there are undoubtedly other distinctions (e.g., most 
                                                                                                                           
 252 Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/FAQ/lsfaqs.htm [http://perma.cc/LF6L-AHAQ]. 
 253 See 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE U.S., ITS AGENCIES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES § 2:10 
(2018) (explaining that the question of whether the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers’ Compen-
sation Act (LHWCA) bars constitutional claims is generally not at issue because LHWCA dis-
putes are between two private parties). 
 254 Id. (citing Wilder v. United States, 873 F.2d 285 (11th Cir. 1989)). Unless an administra-
tive decision is made on the applicability of the LHWCA, an employee’s acceptance of a volun-
tary LHWCA award is not conclusive in barring the employee’s ability to sue under the FTCA. 
Villanova, 851 F.2d at 5–6. 
 255 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE U.S., ITS AGENCIES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, supra 
note 253, § 2:10 (citing Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. United States, 937 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
 256 See Warner v. Contract Claims Servs., Inc., No. 7:17-CV-17-FL, 2017 WL 5075250, at *1 
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 3, 2017) (providing an example of a LHWCA case appealed in federal court). 
 257 See Hendrix v. Alcoa, Inc., 506 S.W.3d 230, 238 (Ark. 2016) (Danielson, J., dissenting) 
(referring to workers’ compensation as a “grand bargain”). The following cases refer to workers’ 
compensation using the same language. See, e.g., Baker v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 872 N.W.2d 
672, 676–77 (Iowa 2015); Cross v. Slayter Trucking Cos., 206 So. 3d 1124, 1130–31 (La. App. 
2016); Whedbee v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins. Fund, 845 N.W.2d 632, 637 (N.D. 2014); 
Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 381 P.3d 768, 786 (Okla. 2016); Collins v. COP Wyo., LLC, 366 P.3d 
521, 527 (Wyo. 2016). 
 258 Emily A. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain: Compensation for Work Injuries in 
the United States, 1900–2017, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 891, 916 (2017). But see generally Price V. 
Fishback, Long-Term Trends Related to the Grand Bargain of Workers’ Compensation, 69 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 1185 (2017) (commenting on and disagreeing in part with Emily Spieler’s article). 
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of these programs exclude intentional torts),259 one thing is clear: although 
the idea of limiting access to civil tort actions in certain situations is not 
unique to the armed forces, the incidence of unchecked and undeterred mis-
conduct in the military described in this Article powerfully suggests the 
need for change. In the closed universe of military justice and administra-
tive compensation, something is amiss. It stands to reason that the Feres bar 
has played a central role by greatly limiting the deterrent impact of civil 
judgments, allowing gross misconduct to occur without consequence. 
IV. THE CURRENT FERES ENVIRONMENT 
The Feres v. United States doctrine, like the scope of the DFE,260 has 
been the topic of endless discussion and the target of frequent criticism.261 
Although there is no general agreement on the best next step in a post-Feres 
legal universe, a real change, and not just juridical side-stepping, is needed. 
Isolated examples of “work-arounds” where Feres did not block a claim 
(e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation),262 and the com-
pensation provided for exposure injuries and open pit burns,263 are hardly an 
answer. Most cases result in limited or no recourse.264 For example, the at-
                                                                                                                           
 259 See Matthew K. Brown, Note, How Exclusive Is the Workers’ Compensation Exclusive 
Remedy? 2010 Amendments to Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Statute Shoot Down Parret, 65 
OKLA. L. REV. 75, 79 (2012) (discussing the intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation). 
 260 See generally Stephen L. Nelson, The King’s Wrongs and the Federal District Courts: 
Understanding the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 259 (2009) (explaining how the discretionary function exception operates); Jonathan R. 
Bruno, Note, Immunity for “Discretionary” Functions: A Proposal to Amend the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 412 (2012) (discussing the discretionary function exception 
and the controversy surrounding it); Lawrence Kaminski, Comment, Torts—Application of Dis-
cretionary Function Exception of Federal Tort Claims Act, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 88 (1952) (noting 
the confusion generated by the discretionary function exception). 
 261 See Brou, supra note 188, at 15 (criticizing the Feres doctrine). The following represents 
an abbreviated list of scholars who have criticized the doctrine as well. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra 
note 202, at 996–97; Michael I. Spak & Jonathan P. Tomes, Sexual Harassment in the Military: 
Time for a Change of Forum? 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 345 (1999); Turley, supra note 36, at 10; 
Carpenter, supra note 63, at 59–60; Feldmeier, supra note 63, at 150; Andrew Hyer, Comment, 
The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposal for a Workable 
Analysis, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1091, 1109–10; Melvani, supra note 18, at 428–29; Wiltberger, 
supra note 58, at 497–98; Zyznar, supra note 77, at 626. 
 262 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 746, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(approving a settlement in a product liability action for servicemembers affected by the use of 
Agent Orange during the Vietnam War). Later, the Agent Orange Act was passed. Agent Orange 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, § 3, 105 Stat. 11; see also 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2018). 
 263 See Dignified Burial and Other Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
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tempt to address water toxicity at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune pro-
vided for notification and only limited benefits—and only then to those sta-
tioned at the camp.265 There was also a proposal to create a separate com-
pensation system for military victims of sexual assault and harassment.266 
None of these examples, however, would open the courthouse doors to 
claims by service members. 
The last major legislative proposal, the Carmelo Rodriguez Malprac-
tice and Injustice Act,267 was presented to Congress in 2009.268 The bill 
sought to amend the FTCA to “allow claims for damages to be brought 
against the United States for personal injury or death . . . arising out of . . . 
medical, dental, or related [malpractice].”269 The bill was to honor Sergeant 
Carmelo Rodriguez, who died after a military doctor misdiagnosed a deadly 
malignant melanoma.270 Even after hearings that made clear that service 
members “would not be allowed to bring suits ‘arising out of . . . armed 
conflict,’”271 negotiations broke down and the bill died when differences 
could not be resolved between those who wanted to enhance the intra-
military compensation system and those seeking to undo Feres.272 
The last time the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a Feres case 
where major change seemed quite possible was United States v. Johnson in 
1987.273 In Johnson, the plaintiff died in a rescue mission while on board a 
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HH-52 Seaguard.274 The crash was attributed to the negligence of civilian 
FAA air traffic controllers.275 The decedent’s estate argued that Feres should 
not apply because (1) the FAA is a civilian agency, and (2) the actions lead-
ing to the crash were not incident to service. The Court, however, rejected 
both arguments276 and left little room for doubt regarding Feres: “This 
Court has never deviated from this characterization of the Feres bar . . . in 
the close to 40 years since it was articulated . . . .”277 Passing the buck 
somewhat, the Court noted that Congress has the power to alter the rule if it 
determines that Feres was a misinterpretation of the FTCA.278 As noted ear-
lier in this Article, it is in the Johnson dissent that Justice Scalia and others 
concluded that “Feres was wrongly decided . . . .”279 At different points, 
Justices Ginsburg and Thomas also implied that the Feres doctrine, at a 
minimum, deserves a second look.280 Despite having a number of opportu-
nities to do so, however, the Court has left Feres unchanged.281 
Notwithstanding the concerns and criticisms noted in this Article, there 
remains clear and understandable opposition to change. Within the ranks, 
Dr. Jonathan Woodson, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health 
Affairs, warned that “chaos” would result if troops were allowed to sue for 
injuries.282 Major General John D. Altenburg, Jr. (Retired), would instead 
prefer to improve the current benefits system.283 In academia, there is also 
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meaningful and solid scholarship284 supporting Feres, including Professor 
Paul Figley’s eloquent defense of the doctrine (along with a suggestion of 
how the doctrine could be clarified).285 Professor Figley’s analysis is con-
sistent with the reasoning in Feres and Stencel Aero Engineering v. United 
States, decided by the Supreme Court in 1977.286 
Stencel applies Feres to a broad range of claims that could be brought 
by various third parties and government contractors against the federal gov-
ernment. It relies on the same reasoning as Feres: the necessity of preserv-
ing the chain-of-command, the unique nature of the military, and the im-
portance of allowing discretionary and command judgments to remain in 
the military and not be second-guessed by federal courts.287 The Feres-
Stencel doctrine has also barred claims initiated by injured service members 
against third parties and government contractors, rendering those contrac-
tors practically immune from civil tort litigation in fields as diverse as 
product liability and medical services.288 
Notwithstanding the stubbornly unchanging position held by the Court, 
in the ranks, and in some corners of the legal professoriate, the tone of a 
number of circuit courts is wistful and unenthusiastic. These courts decry 
the unsoundness, harsh impact, and basic unfairness of Feres, while recog-
nizing the case as binding precedent.289 Consider Daniel v. United States, a 
wrongful-death/malpractice case, decided by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in 2018. After childbirth in a military hospital, 
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Lieutenant Daniel began hemorrhaging.290 Those entrusted with her care 
failed to take the appropriate steps to stop the bleeding and she died in a 
few hours.291 The district court found that it had no option but to dismiss the 
claim based on Feres “[u]nless and until Congress or the Supreme Court 
choose to confine the unfairness and irrationality that Feres has bred 
. . . .”292 The Ninth Circuit agreed,293 acknowledging that “[i]f ever there 
were a case to carve out an exception to the Feres doctrine, this . . . is it,” 
but noted that “only the Supreme Court has the tools to do so.”294 A petition 
for certiorari is currently pending.295 
Similarly, in Ortiz v. United States, decided by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 2015, a malpractice case where errors 
made during a caesarian section led to significant deficits in a child,296 the 
Tenth Circuit declared that “the facts . . . exemplify the overbreadth (and 
unfairness) of the doctrine, but Feres is not ours to overrule.”297 Quoting 
Costo v. United States, a 2001 Ninth Circuit decision, the Tenth Circuit 
“join[ed] the many panels of this Court that have criticized the inequitable 
extension of this doctrine to a range of situations that seem far removed 
from the doctrine’s original purposes.”298  
In Witt v. United States, a 2009 case from the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of California, surgical malpractice left the 
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plaintiff in a permanent vegetative state.299 The district court dismissed, not-
ing, however, that the alleged facts were “so egregious and the liability of 
the Defendant [seemed] so clear,” that the court “did give serious considera-
tion to Plaintiff’s argument that this Court should allow [the] claim in spite 
of Feres . . . .”300 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that it was “bound by 
precedent of the Supreme Court . . . to affirm the . . . dismissal.”301 In Haft-
erson v. United States, another malpractice/wrongful-death case decided by 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in 
2008,302 the court found that “[d]espite Plaintiffs’ well-reasoned opposition 
to [the] application of the Feres doctrine, it is clear that this case cannot es-
cape the doctrine’s broad reach.”303 
In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decid-
ed Read v. United States, in which a military surgeon sliced into the plain-
tiff’s aorta in the course of routine gallbladder surgery.304 The Fifth Circuit 
held as follows: “Irrespective of criticism of the Feres doctrine . . . the gov-
ernment remains immune [because] Colton Read’s injuries were ‘incident to 
service’ and not actionable under the FTCA.”305 
As the above cases suggest, although there are expressions of regret 
regarding the doctrine, there is also nearly uniform adherence to Feres. 
Many who have studied the doctrine306 urge comprehensive change307 to 
“permit the adjudication of personal injury and death claims . . . .”308 Others 
urge an “impact on military discipline” test to “define ‘incident to service,’” 
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to “cure the ills of this doctrine and protect the rights of our nation’s ser-
vicemembers.”309 If one assumes there are currently injuries and related 
claims that are in no way incident to anything remotely resembling military 
service (e.g., sexual assault and clear or gross malpractice), what options 
exist to provide access to justice in Article III courts? The Court and Con-
gress unquestionably have the capacity to undo Feres—but then what? 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
There are, at a minimum, three options: 
  1. Leave Feres v. United States and the FTCA as is; 
  2. By congressional or judicial action, overrule Feres and do noth-
ing further, in which case, service-related civil tort claims against 
the government would have to be based on the FTCA, limited un-
predictably by the DFE, mimicking the uncertain civil tort envi-
ronment between 1946 and 1950; 
  3. Overrule Feres, amend the FTCA, and specify those behaviors, 
events, practices, or actions that are not incident to or essential for 
service and therefore potentially actionable.310 
Option three is the best course. 
To start, option one is out. As is suggested throughout this Article, 
Feres has run its course, spawned an epidemic of undeterred misconduct, 
and left countless thousands of innocent victims without remedy, without 
justice, and without their day in court. 
Option two is also inadvisable. Were Feres overruled without further 
clarification, there would be unpredictable and discordant exposure to tort 
liability under the FTCA as well as a continuation of irrational limitations 
on liability due to the multiple exceptions in the FTCA including, of course, 
the expansive DFE.311 The DFE has expanded beyond any fair interpreta-
tion of the text of the statute and precludes meritorious claims while secur-
ing “nothing of value except perhaps a modest savings in litigation 
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costs.”312 Without amendments, the FTCA alone would leave victims in the 
Neverland of the DFE, the “broadest and most criticized” of the thirteen 
enumerated exceptions to that Act.313 
That more of a change is needed seems obvious, which is why option 
three is preferable. The goal would be to help courts determine what actions 
are an essential component of military service (and therefore not actionable) 
and those that do not involve an essential component of military service 
(and are potentially actionable claims). 
Although this solution, at least initially, cannot resolve with certainty 
the question of the effect of civil liability on military discipline and chain-
of-command, it would leave untouched the existing array of potent sanc-
tions for misconduct, failure to follow lawful orders, or failure to comply 
with a host of regulations currently in place. These powerful mechanisms 
should be sufficient to prevent the chaos that defenders of Feres fear. A lim-
ited number of civil tort cases focused on undeniable misconduct seems 
unlikely to prompt insubordination or a collapse of order and discipline. 
Instead, it is far more likely that overruling Feres and amending the FTCA 
will give justice to victims of wrongdoing and deter future misconduct. 
On that point, it is fair to wonder whether the incidence of sexual as-
sault, domestic violence, clear or gross medical malpractice, physical abuse, 
and similar wrongs would decline in the presence of the potential for gov-
ernmental tort liability. Does the potential for money damages in a civil 
court deter future misconduct if the actors in question do not pay but the 
federal government does?314 
First, at a personal level, litigation forces victims and alleged wrong-
doers to relive some of the worst moments of their lives. Cases of this type 
are painful and jarring. No one with even a passing understanding of our 
legal system would look forward to the essential rigors of civil litigation. 
That alone is a deterrent force. Second, a finding of fault in civil courts may 
have a real and direct effect on those accused of wrongdoing. It takes no 
imagination to anticipate that a finding of liability in an Article III court 
predicated on a determination of misconduct could activate an inquiry and 
may be the opening shot for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings within 
the military justice system. Third, at a governmental level, it would be fan-
ciful to assume there would be no deterrent effect from civil tort litigation. 
Like any entity subject to litigation, our military services will do what they 
can to make sure they are not hauled into court. There is, then, much to be 
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gained (and unfortunately much to be deterred) from the imposition of lia-
bility. 
Whether there will be beneficial consequences from opening the 
courthouse doors to claims currently barred by Feres is a question more 
easily answered than the extent to which civil liability will affect the com-
mand structure on which the military must depend. The necessity of follow-
ing lawful orders without question is vital to all missions our military under-
takes. Similarly, unlike many walks of public and private life, there is a phys-
icality to the military training experience that is both essential and, on occa-
sion, painful and harsh. Training is not just athletic conditioning. Troops 
training for combat must be pushed to the limits of their endurance, both 
physically and psychologically. To create individuals and units that act with 
a common purpose and a willingness to risk one’s life for one’s comrades, 
the starting point is often stripping recruits of practices, habits, and ideas 
they bring with them to the service and replacing those beliefs with the val-
ues of mission, task, country, command, service, and more. 
The kind of training and service just described involves actions that 
could be seen outside of the military as tortious but in fact are vitally im-
portant.315 Such actions cannot be the basis of civil tort liability.316 Like inju-
ries sustained in combat or armed conflict, these would be harms sustained in 
actions not just incident to but essential to military service. or such harms, 
there is no place for civilian courts to reassess essential military judgments. 
Accordingly, the best approach is not an open-ended civil tort universe 
where any potentially actionable behavior in the military could become the 
subject of litigation. Instead, this recommendation identifies only seven 
specific behaviors that are actionable. The following actions or behaviors 
should be excluded from the rights-limiting regime spawned by the DFE 
and Feres because they are not essential to military service: 
  1. Sexual assault. 
  2. Rape. 
  3. Extreme physical violence or acts that fall within the definition 
of torture, domestic violence, and child abuse. 
  4. Acts of clear or gross medical malpractice.317 
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  5. Exposure of service members to pharmaceuticals, narcotics, or 
toxins without informed and voluntary consent.318 
  6. While in military service, acts of driving under the influence of 
drugs or narcotics on more than one occasion. 
  7. Acts or patterns of invidious discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion, ethnicity, or gender. 
The above actions are as intolerable in military life as in civilian life. 
Those who have been victims of such acts should be able to pursue their 
claims in Article III courts, the system of justice they pledged to defend. In 
this model, the UCMJ is unchanged and unaffected. The approved intense, 
demanding, painful, and harsh physical and psychological demands of train-
ing are not lessened. Discipline, chain-of-command, tradition, efficiency, 
and the unquestioning following of all lawful orders are not disrupted. 
When those who engage in misconduct are held accountable, when 
government is obligated to remedy those wrongs, respect for order, disci-
pline, and all other standards will increase. When uniformly condemned 
actions are subjected to public scrutiny in Article III courts, the probability 
of future similar misconduct will decline. 
Assuming these recommendations are followed, it would only make 
sense for Congress to revisit the impact of the proposed amendment to the 
FTCA within a few years and assess whether limited exposure to tort liabil-
ity impedes, improves, or has no discernible effect on the capacity of our 
armed forces to carry out all essential functions.319 In the meantime, as the 
courthouse doors open partially, those who engage in the unquestionable 
misconduct described throughout this Article will be subject to legal sanc-
tions, and those victimized will finally have their day in court. 
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